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INTRODUCTION
If a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light of some
assumed purpose. A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or
objective, is nonsense.'
-Karl Llewellyn
In the latter half of the twentieth century, Congress drafted a
law to solve a problem. As decades passed, that problem became
increasingly complex. In the new millennium, Congress became
increasingly polarized, 2 and increasingly unproductive. 3 In the face of
that inaction, the executive branch decided to rely on a provision of that
earlier law to address a modern facet of that earlier problem. Or
litigants decided to ask a court to rely on a provision of that earlier law
to address a modern facet of that earlier problem. The Congress that
drafted the law might not have understood this modern application, the
law's legislative history might be vague and confusing, and this modern
interpretation might have important consequences for the overall evil
that the earlier law was meant to remedy. What's a court to do?
This issue-what to do when the broad purpose of the law is
evident, but the applicability in a particular scenario is less than clear-
is an increasing problem that the Supreme Court will address in coming
terms.4 An example of seemingly clear purpose in the midst of confusing
1. Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950).
2. See, e.g., Christopher Ingraham, A Stunning Visualization of Our Divided Congress,
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/
04/23/a-stunning-visualization-of-our-divided-congress/ [https://perma.cc/DRT7-SK9X].
3. See Mark Murray, Congress on Track To Be Least Productive in Modern History, NBC
NEWS (July 31, 2014, 10:21 AM), http://www.nbenews.com/politics/first-read/congress-track-be-
least-productive-modern-history-n169546 [https://perma.cc/2VAL-6GM2].
4. Two examples of such issues that were bound for the Supreme Court before the election
were the interpretation of Title IX in the context of transgender discrimination and the
interpretation of the Clean Air Act in the context of the Clean Power Plan. Title IX states that
"'[n]o person ... shall, on the basis of sex ... be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.' 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)." G.G. v. Gloucester
Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 715 (4th Cir. 2016). The agency in charge of implementing this
provision, the Department of Education ("DOE"), issued a regulation in 1980 stating that "[a]
recipient [of federal funds] may provide separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the
basis of sex, but such facilities provided for students of one sex shall be comparable to such facilities
provided for students of the other sex." 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2017). In 2015, the DOE issued an
"opinion letter," which clarified that schools "generally must treat transgender students consistent
with their gender identity." G.G., 822 F.3d at 715. The immediate legal issue for those challenging
the DOE's policy concerns the limits of Auer deference-that agencies should be given deference
when interpreting their own regulations. See id. at 719. But ultimately, this is a matter of
statutory interpretation in the face of clear policy goals and changed circumstances. In other
words, the drafters of Title IX most likely did not consider discrimination against transgender
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legislative history confronted the Court in King v. Burwell.6 King is a
striking example of this issue because the litigation did not revolve
around an obscure provision of a decades-old law, but rather on an
obscure provision of a less-than-a-decade old law.6 Yet the contentious
nature of modern legislating still left a confused record regarding the
applicability of a particular provision and left the Court with a choice:
effectuate the broad purpose of the law, or hold the drafters to their
words.7 This Note will address this issue through the lens of a topic less
controversial than the Affordable Care Act: an obscure jurisdiction-
stripping provision of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). 8 Specifically, this Note
will propose that judges read a word entirely out of CERCLA,9 just as
students when they wrote "on the basis of sex." "Gender identity disorder," now "gender
dysphoria," was not included in the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual until 1980. See Eve Glicksman, Transgender Today, AM. PSYCHOL. Ass'N MONITOR ON
PSYCHOL. (Apr. 2013), http://www.apa.org/monitor/2013/04/transgender.aspx [https://perma.cc/
MQ3A-MTNZ]. But if "sex" is now understood as referring to a student's preferred gender, a literal
(or perhaps originalist) reading of Title IX would not necessarily effectuate the policy goals
inherent in Title IX-to eliminate discrimination on the basis of sex in educational institutions.
After granting cert on the Fourth Circuit case, the Trump administration DOE rescinded the
guidance, and the Supreme Court has instead sent the case back to the 4th Circuit. Amy Howe,
Justices Send Transgender Bathroom Case Back to Lower Courts, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 6, 2017),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/justices-send-transgender-bathroom-case-back-lower-courts/
[https://perma.cc/KF7R-D9ND]. Litigation surrounding the Clean Power Plan presented a similar
issue. The Clean Power Plan's regulation of C02 emissions for existing power plants rests on
Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,710 (Oct. 23, 2015)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 et seq.). That provision has a particularly tortured legislative
history: for instance, two conflicting amendments to section 111(d) were passed simultaneously by
Congress in 1990. See Avi Zevin, Dueling Amendments: The Applicability of Section 111(d) of the
Clean Air Act to Greenhouse Gases 4 (Inst. for Policy Integrity, Working Paper No. 2014/5, 2013).
Section 111(d) has a fairly straightforward purpose: to provide the EPA with the ability to regulate
pollutants from existing sources once it has begun regulating that pollutant when emitted from
new sources. See id. at 10. Congress almost certainly did not consider section 111(d) as a vehicle
through which the EPA would regulate the entire electricity generation industry's emission of
C02. See Brief for Petitioners at 6, West Virginia v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 15-
1363 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2016) ("Congress did not intend and could not have imagined such a result
when it passed the provision more than 45 years ago."). But if it is read literally (or at least if the
version in the U.S. Code is read literally) it in fact compels the EPA to do just that.
5. See generally King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
6. See infra Part I for an explanation of the basics of King v. Burwell. The Affordable Care
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), was passed in 2010, and the litigation that led to
King was based on an IRS rule from 2012 that interpreted a provision of that law. See Health
Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377 (May 23, 2012) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
7. See infra Part I; see also infra Section III.C.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2012).
9. This Note actually considers a provision of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). But that provision, like
most of SARA, amended a section of CERCLA, and thus this Note does propose reading a word
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the Court read four words out of the Affordable Care Act. 10 In doing so,
this Note will highlight, and question, three possible reasons for such a
drastic remedial reading: (1) that Congress has failed to fix the statute
and, as such, judges must do so; (2) that judges should read statutes
differently when presented with a "major question"; and (3) that judges
should employ such drastic remedial reading when the intent of the
legislature is particularly clear.
Part I will orient the reader with the issue in King v. Burwell,
as well as show how this Note understands the remedial purposes
canon. Part II will discuss the nature of the jurisdiction-stripping
problem in CERCLA in the context of CERCLA's legislative history. As
Part II will demonstrate, CERCLA and particularly the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA") are excellent examples
for exploring the remedial purposes canon, as they are both paragons of
remedial statutes. Part III will address the solution of applying the
remedial purposes canon, and whether the possible reasons for reading
around the words of a statute distinguish the Affordable Care Act from
CERCLA.
I. JUST JIGGERY-POKERY?:
THE BASICS OF KING V. BURWELL AND REMEDIAL READING
The following Part will give the reader the background of King
v. Burwell and the nature of the problem that confronted the Court:
whether to read around the plain language of a statute in order to effect
the assumed purpose of the enacting Congress. This Part will then
explain how this Note understands the remedial purposes canon and
the concept of remedial reading.
A. The Basics of King v. Burwell
King v. Burwell," on its face, was a standard case of statutory
interpretation. 12 An agency interpreted four words in a statute to mean
one thing; the Petitioners argued that they meant another. 13 Ever since
the initial filings, this case carried with it a common narrative: clear
entirely out of what is now CERCLA. See infra Part II for an explanation of the history of CERCLA
and the passage of SARA.
10. See infra Parts I, III.
11. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
12. See, e.g., Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Interpreting Statutes,
SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 18, 2015, 12:47 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/02/scotus-for-law-
students-interpreting-statutes/ [https://perma.cc/3KS6-VFRM].
13. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488.
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language versus clear intent. 1 4 That is, the language at issue was
supposedly clear and unambiguous, but the intention of Congress,
which was supposedly just as clear and unambiguous, was
diametrically opposed to that language.1 5
The immediate legal issue in King was fairly straightforward.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 16 ("ACA") provides
individuals with tax subsidies to offset the cost of insurance. The ACA
makes these subsidies available only if the individual purchases
insurance on an insurance exchange "established by the State."" An
insurance exchange is essentially a government-operated insurance
marketplace.1 8 In 2012, the IRS published a regulation stating that
exchanges established by the federal government qualify as exchanges
"established by the State," and individuals who purchase insurance on
a federally established exchange are equally capable of receiving tax
credits as those who purchased insurance on a state-established
exchange.1 9 This regulation was challenged as an impermissible
interpretation in several courts. 20 Ultimately, after two appellate courts
came down on different sides of the issues on the same day, 2 1 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 22
A ruling by the Court invalidating the IRS regulation would
have effectively ended the Affordable Care Act. To understand why, one
needs to understand some basic premises of the health insurance
market. Health insurers, like all insurers, calculate risk and charge
more for riskier behavior-home insurance for a home in a floodplain
costs more than home insurance for a home on dryer land; car insurance
is higher for people with poorer driving records; and health insurers
14. Compare, e.g., Elizabeth B. Wydra, The Law's Intent Is Clear, US NEWS: DEBATE CLUB
(Mar. 3, 2015, 12:24 PM), http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-the-supreme-court-strike-
down-obamacare-subsidies-in-king-v-burwell/the-laws-intent-is-clear [https://perma.cc/4PAJ-
KAVD] (arguing the law's intent is clear), with Jackie Bodnar, The IRS Can't Write Its Own Laws,
US NEWS: DEBATE CLUB (Mar. 3, 2015, 12:24 PM), http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-
the-supreme-court-strike-down-obamacare-subsidies-in-king-v-burwell/the-irs-cant-write-its-
own-laws [https://perma.cc/S5KL-NGBT] (arguing language is clear). .
15. Again, this was a common perception, not necessarily the reality.
16. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
17. See 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (2012).
18. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485.
19. See Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377 (May 23, 2012) (codified
at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
20. See, e.g., Halbig v. Sebelius, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2014); King v. Sebelius, 997 F.
Supp. 2d 415 (E.D. Va. 2014); Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Burwell, 51 F. Supp. 3d 1080 (E.D. Okla.
2014).
21. See King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014) (upholding the IRS interpretation);
Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (vacating the IRS interpretation).
22. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014).
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would like to charge more for people who get sick more often, or in more
catastrophic ways. This basic principle led to health insurers failing to
provide affordable health insurance to people with serious medical
problems, arguably the very people who most needed health
insurance. 23 One could correct this problem by requiring health
insurers to provide insurance to everyone, regardless of their health
status, a mechanism known as "guaranteed issue."2 4 But a guaranteed
issuance of health insurance does not address the problem of cost-
health insurers would provide health insurance to those who are
already sick, but they would charge accordingly, presumably at a rate
that many sick people would not be able to afford. 25 One could correct
that problem by prohibiting health insurers from charging higher
premiums to sick people, a mechanism known as "community rating." 26
But if health insurers were forced to provide insurance to sick people
and could not charge them more for the increased risk that the health
insurer was taking on, customers would be incentivized to wait until
they were sick to purchase health insurance. 27 This would result in a
"death spiral" where the health insurer is paying more and more in
healthcare costs for their sick customers, and receiving less and less
from healthy people paying premiums. 28 One could fix that problem by
requiring that everyone purchase health insurance regardless of their
health status, a mechanism known as an "individual mandate." 29 But
not everyone can afford health insurance. 30 This last problem can be
23. See, e.g., Randi Kaye, Too Sick for Comprehensive Health Insurance?, CNN MONEY (Oct.
5, 2009, 11:14 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/02/pf/too sick for health care/ [https://perma
.cclU5X8-DZW8]; Christine Lagorio, When Health Coverage Doesn't Hold Up, CBS NEWS (May 24,
2007, 4:55 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/when-health-coverage-doesnt-hold-up/
[https://perma.cc/KE82-6T6P]. It should be noted that the problems with health insurance in
America are extremely varied and complex. To explain the basics of the ACA, this Note focuses on
one facet for the sake of simplicity.
24. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015).
25. This is because there is a theoretical price at which an insurer would be willing to provide
health insurance to anyone-namely the cost of that person's medical care-but a prospective
insurance consumer cannot afford the cost of that medical care, otherwise they would not purchase
insurance.
26. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485. "Community rating" means that the health insurer will
charge the same for everyone in a given community, "regardless of their health status." Health
Insurance Glossary, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG, https://www.healthinsurance.org/glossary/
community-rating/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7FUM-MP7B].
27. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485; Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform Is a "Three-Legged
Stool," CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 1, 2 (Aug. 2010), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/
uploads/issues/2010/08/pdfirepealingreform.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NTC-SK2N].
28. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485.
29. See id. at 2486; Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012).
30. See Gruber, supra note 27, at 3 ("[Mlany families cannot afford health insurance at those
community-rated prices.").
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fixed by providing tax credits to people who cannot afford health
insurance. 31 And hence you have the "three-legged stool" upon which
the ACA is built: (1) "new rules that prevent insurers from denying
coverage or raising premiums based on preexisting conditions," (the
guaranteed issue and community rating requirements), (2)
"requirements that everyone buy insurance" (the individual mandate),
and (3) "subsidies to make that insurance affordable." 32
The three prongs are interdependent: requiring health insurers
to provide everyone with insurance without requiring that healthy
people buy insurance would lead to a "death spiral." 33 Requiring
everyone to buy insurance without forcing insurers to provide that
insurance would be meaningless, as would requiring everyone to buy
insurance without making it affordable, and so on. 3 4 The permissibility
of the IRS regulation affected the third leg of the stool: tax credits to
make insurance affordable. At the time King came before the Court,
only fourteen states had set up their own exchanges. 35 This meant that
the majority of people who had purchased health insurance on an
exchange had done so on a federally established exchange under the
assumption that they would receive tax credits.36 Therefore, if the Court
decided to hold the IRS regulation to be an impermissible interpretation
of the law-that is, if there were no tax credits on a federal exchange-
the third leg would have collapsed. By one estimate, if the Court had
ruled in favor of the Petitioner's interpretation, over six million people
would have lost tax credits, equivalent to almost $2 billion.37
Ultimately, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority,
upheld the IRS' interpretation that "established by the State" was
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2.
33. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485.
34. See Raman Khanna, The Affordable Care Act, Part 3. The Three Legged Stool, J. AM.
MED. AsS'N INTERNAL MED. BLOG (May 15, 2014), https://internalmedicineblog.jamainternalmed
.com/2014/05/15/the-affordable-care-act-part-3-the-three-legged-stool/ [https://perm-a.cc/75DM-
TR4L] (explaining, through hypotheticals, why the three legs of the stool are interdependent).
35. Including the District of Columbia. See Health Insurance Marketplaces 2015 Open
Enrollment Period: March Enrollment Report, DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 2-3 (Mar. 10, 2015),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/83656/ib_2015mar-enrollment.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QTN4-KLLJ].
36. The majority of people purchased insurance on the Federal Exchange because the
majority of states did not set up state exchanges. See id. Those who purchased insurance on the
Federal Exchange assumed they would receive tax credits because that was the law as interpreted
by the IRS. See Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377 (May 23, 2012)
(codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
37. State-by-State Effects of a Ruling for the Challengers in King v. Burwell, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (June 2, 2015), http://kff.org/interactive/king-v-burwell-effects/ [https://perma.cc/9AF2-
B4R7].
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meaningless and that individuals who purchased insurance on the
Federal Exchange could receive tax credits. 38 Roberts essentially read
four words out of the statute on the reasoning that Congress did not
intend those four words to be there, or at least to mean what they
apparently say.39
Roberts's analysis was fairly simple. The language at issue
comes from section 1401 of the ACA, now codified at 26 U.S.C. § 36B.
As Roberts read it, "The amount of the tax credit depends in part on
whether the taxpayer has enrolled in an insurance plan through 'an
Exchange established by the State under section 1311 of the [ACA].' "40
Roberts broke section 36B's language into three parts.41 To receive tax
credits, a person must have purchased insurance on (1) "an Exchange,"
(2) "established by the State," and (3) "under § 1311."42 Step one was
relatively easy. Section 1311 implores states to set up "an American
Health Benefit Exchange . .. for the State," and section 1333 provides
that, if a state fails to set up an exchange, the Secretary of Health and
38. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495-96.
39. See id.
40. Id. at 2487. The press coverage of this case suggested that this language was clear. See,
e.g., Bodnar, supra note 14. Justice Scalia contended that "[i]t is hard to come up with a clearer
way to limit tax credits to State Exchanges." King, 135 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But
as Roberts correctly stated, the tax credit amount depends on whether the taxpayer purchases
insurance on an appropriate exchange, not that the issuance of any tax credit at all depends on
the type of exchange. See id. at 2487. Even Roberts's language, however, belies a fair amount of
complexity. The ACA calculates the amount of tax subsidies owed to an individual, the "premium
assistance credit amount," by determining a "premium assistance amount," and the "premium
assistance amount" is in turn determined by adding together the cost of a person's premiums for
each "coverage month," defined as a month in which a person is covered by a plan they enrolled in
through "an Exchange established by the State." 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b) (2012). In other words, the
law does not so much state that subsidies are only available through state exchanges, as provide a
tiered calculation for determining subsidies that would always add up to zero for those who
purchase insurance on a Federal Exchange. See King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 368 (4th Cir. 2014)
("Under the plaintiffs' construction, the premium credit amount for individuals purchasing
insurance through a Federal Exchange would always be zero."). This is not exactly "plain
language." Cf. Brief of Amicus Curiae Judicial Watch, Inc. in Support of Petitioners, King v.
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114), 2014 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4583, at *6 ("Section
36B plainly states that only an individual who purchases health insurance coverage 'through an
Exchange established by the State under section 1311 of the [ACA]' is eligible to receive refundable
tax credits." (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (second alteration in original)). In Halbig v.
Sebelius, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2014), it took Judge Friedman five paragraphs and nearly an
entire page of his opinion to explain the connection between "established by the State" and tax
credit availability. See 27 F. Supp. 3d at 18. In fact, this section of the law is confusing enough to
have possibly stymied a Federal Court of Appeals judge: in Judge Gregory's otherwise excellent
summary of the law he states that "the premium assistance amount is the sum of the monthly
premium assistance amounts for all 'coverage months,'" when in fact the premium assistance
credit amount is the sum of the monthly premium assistance amount for all coverage months. See
King, 759 F.3d at 368.
41. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
42. Id.
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Human Services will set up "such Exchange," implying that federal and
state established exchanges are functionally equivalent.43
The second step was the ambiguity vel non of § 36B's
"established by the State" language. That is, federal and state
exchanges may be functionally the same, but § 36B nevertheless
expressly mentions who established the exchange as a qualifier for who
gets tax credits.44 As evidence that this qualifying language does not
mean what it apparently says, Chief Justice Roberts relied on the
"qualified individual" conundrum. 45 The Act defines a "qualified
individual" as an individual who "resides in the State that established
the Exchange," 46 but also "provides that all Exchanges shall make
available qualified health plans to qualified individuals."4 7 Read
literally, this would appear to mean that a federally established
exchange has to provide health insurance plans, even if it has no eligible
customers to whom it can provide such plans. 48 For Chief Justice
Roberts, this was evidence that "established by the State" may not
mean what it seems to say.
Step three, determining whether the phrase "under § 1311"
could apply to a federal exchange, was the thorniest step. The Act
provides two sections for setting up exchanges: section 1311 for state
43. Id. at 2489-90. At least Roberts seemed to think this step was relatively easy. He claimed
that both parties "agree[d] that a Federal Exchange qualifies as 'an Exchange' for purposes of
Section 36B." Id. at 2489. However, to support this assertion Roberts cited the Petitioner's brief,
and it is not apparent that they would agree with his "such Exchange" argument. See Brief for
Petitioners, King, 135 S. Ct. at 2480 (No. 14-114), 2014 WL 7386999, at *22 ('The word 'such'
cannot bear this weight."). Furthermore, Scalia does not readily concede this point. King, 135 S.
Ct. at 2500 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The word 'such' does not help the Court one whit.").
44. See id. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is perhaps telling that Roberts reinvokes the
"statutory scheme" instruction from FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000), here. Id. at 2490.
45. See id.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added); King, 135 S. Ct. at 2490.
47. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2490 (quotations and citations omitted).
48. Id.; see also King v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 358, 370 (4th Cir. 2014). The counterargument to
this "qualified individual" conundrum is that § 1312(a), which defines "qualified individual," states
that "[a] qualified individual may enroll in any qualified health plan," 42 U.S.C § 18032(a)(1) (2012)
(emphasis added); Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 404 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and not that "only a
qualified individual may enroll in such a plan." Halbig, 758 F.3d at 404. This counterargument,
however, has a plain (if not fatal) flaw: read in this manner, the Act would allow anyone, from any
state, to purchase health insurance on federal exchanges in any state. That is, this reading would
effectively allow interstate insurance purchases, something the Act clearly only envisioned as
occurring under explicit interstate compacts. See 42 U.S.C. § 18053; see also Richard Cauchi, Out-
of-State Health Insurance-Allowing Purchases, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/out-of-state-health-insurance-purchases.aspx (last updated
Jan. 3, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7UKF-HGFR]; Avik Roy, Will Buying Health Insurance Across State
Lines Reduce Costs?, FORBES (May 11, 2012, 11:52 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
theapothecary/2012/05/1 1/will-buying-health-insurance-across-state-lines-reduce-costs/
[https://perma.cc/4YJ5-UA46].
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exchanges and section 1321 for a federal exchange. 49 How could an
exchange established under section 1311 be an exchange established
under section 1321?50 For Chief Justice Roberts, the answer lay in the
ACA's definitional section.51 The ACA defines "Exchange" as an
"Exchange established under section [1311]."52 So when section 1321
provides that the Secretary may set up "such Exchange," that is an
"Exchange established under section [1311]."53
Chief Justice Roberts did not appear to be particularly concerned
with some of the more obvious arguments against his interpretation. 54
After briskly considering these three steps he simply stated that "[t]he
upshot of all this is that the phrase . .. is properly viewed as
ambiguous," 55 and chalked the whole issue up to an instance of "inartful
drafting."56 Chief Justice Roberts's opinion can ultimately be read as
follows: the policy ramifications of reading this passage literally would
be catastrophic for this law,5 7 and there is just enough ambiguity to
justify reading around the problematic language;5 8 therefore, we will
read four words out of this statute, 59 and "Exchange established by the
state" will operate as "Exchange."
This holding was essentially a dramatic employment of the
remedial purposes canon. To effect the overall goals of the statute, Chief
Justice Roberts read four words out of the statute. This Note will
proceed to discuss whether this type of remedial reading could be
warranted with respect to an obscure provision of CERCLA. But first,
it will define the remedial purposes canon.
B. What is the Remedial Purposes Canon?
Canons of construction have been defined as "[t]he system of
fundamental rules and maxims which are recognized as governing the
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031, 18041 (2012); see King, 135 S. Ct. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 2490 (majority opinion).
52. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(d)(21) (2012)).
53. Id.
54. The simplest argument against this logic is the canon against surplusage: why would the
drafters have explicitly included "established by the State" in section 36B if it did not matter, see
id. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting), especially considering that the Act uses less qualified language
throughout, see id. at 2499 (Scalia, J., dissenting)? Roberts spent a single paragraph addressing
this single argument out of the many made by the petitioner and dissent. See id. at 2492.
55. Id. at 2491.
56. Id. at 2492.
57. See id. at 2486-87.
58. See id. at 2489-92.
59. See id. at 2496.
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construction of written instruments." 60 The remedial purposes canon is
the rule that a statute should be read to address the "mischief' which it
sought to address. 61 Therefore, a court must theoretically "first decide
whether the statute is 'remedial' in nature" before employing the
canon. 62 This Note does not discuss the remedial purpose canon in so
strict a fashion. Virtually all statutes are designed to remedy some
problem. 63 Thinking of the remedial purposes canon as a discrete tool
rather than a generally assumed understanding of statutory language
grew out of a time when common law predominated.64 At a time when
American law was predominantly nonpositive, statutes were necessary
only when legislators meant to supersede the common law, and judges
were supposed to read such statutes with their specific purposes in
mind.65 The general "statutorification" of American law has changed
that calculus.66 Statutes are no longer looked upon as unique ways of
filling in gaps in the common law, but instead are seen as the primary
method of lawmaking.
Therefore, this Note considers "the remedial purposes canon"
broadly-as the general interpretative strategy of reading statutory
language so as best to deal with the "evil" that the law sought to
address. That is not to say that said "evil" is always clearly defined,
which is especially true when the interpretative task is to define the
meaning of a specific provision in a deeply complex law. The broader
the lens, the easier the "remedial purpose" is to discern, and vice versa.
It is relatively uncontroversial, for instance, to suggest that the
"purpose" of the ACA was to "increase the number of Americans covered
by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care."6 7 Chief
Justice Roberts, in King, seemed to read the statutory language at issue
to further that general goal. 6 8 What was decidedly more controversial
was to assume that Congress did not intend to withhold tax credits to
people who purchased health insurance on an exchange established by
60. Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose Canon:
Have Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 199, 208 (1996)
(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 207 (6th ed. 1990)).
61. See id. at 229 ("The remedial purpose canon grew out of the 'mischief rule' of Heydon's
Case.").
62. Id. at 233.
63. See Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 400 ("If a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the
light of some assumed purpose. A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or objective, is
nonsense."); Watson, supra note 60, at 233.
64. See Watson, supra note 60, at 229-32.
65. See id. at 229.
66. Id.
67. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012).
68. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492-94 (2015).
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the federal government, because that would not, at the time the issue
came before the Court, further the general purpose of the ACA. With
this understanding of the remedial purposes canon, as well as the
background of the ACA and King, this Note now proceeds to discuss a
provision of a different law with a clear purpose, passed in an odd and
contentious manner, and containing a provision that perhaps should
not be read to mean what it clearly says.
II. A REMEDY FOR REMEDIES: THE HISTORY OF CERCLA AND THE
NATURE OF THE § 113(H) PROBLEM
In 1945, Jesse Cannon entered into a six-month lease with the
War Department, allowing it to test weapons on his property with one
condition: that the Army clean up whatever mess it made. 69 Over sixty
years later, in 2005, Jesse Cannon's grandsons were still trying to keep
the government to its word and were suing in federal court in an
attempt to make the government clean up that mess. 70 The Cannons
were unable to procure a remedy, however, because Congress wanted
to make sure that the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") was
not slowed down in its cleanup efforts of toxic sites.71
In 1989, a group of New Jersey citizens worried that a cleanup
plan chosen by the EPA for a particular site would have significant
adverse health effects for the public. 72 Armed with the testimony of
various doctors and specialists, these citizens contended that the
Agency was acting with a dangerous lack of information. 73 But, because
Congress wanted to make sure that the EPA was not stymied by
frivolous lawsuits filed by polluters, the court denied the citizens'
request for a new plan.74
These counterintuitive outcomes are the result of an
extraordinarily broad and "unusual"75 jurisdiction-stripping provision
in the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
("SARA"). 76 This provision, section 113(h), limited the jurisdiction of
federal courts over suits regarding the Comprehensive Environmental
69. Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1330 (10th Cir. 2008).
70. Id. at 1330-32.
71. See id. at 1333-36 (holding that CERCLA's section 113(h), which the court stated was
enacted to prevent delay, denied jurisdiction to the Cannons).
72. See Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency v. Reilly, 716 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D.N.J.
1989).
73. See id.
74. See id. at 837.
75. See ALFRED R. LIGHT, CERCLA LAW AND PROCEDURE 169 (1991).
76. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613; 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2012).
1154 [Vol. 70:3:1143
READING REMEDIALLY
Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA").17 Section
113(h) deals with the timing of review for challenges to removal
actions-actions taken in immediate response to a release of hazardous
materials-and remedial actions-longer term actions designed to
remedy the damage caused by a spill.78 Section 113(h) prevents federal
courts from taking jurisdiction over "any challenges to removal or
remedial action," except under certain specific conditions, including
various actions to recover costs. 79 Challenges to remedial actions were
probably not the immediate harm that Congress was worried about
when passing this amendment,80 but this language effectively bars any
litigant, including those engaged in a traditional citizen suit, to
challenge the EPA's remedial actions until they are completed 81-a
process that may take decades. 82
The following Section will briefly address the history of
CERCLA's passage in more detail, and then the history behind, and
reasons for, Congress's inclusion of the jurisdiction-stripping provision
in the SARA amendments. This Section will make the case that the
enacting Congress did not intend for this jurisdiction-stripping
provision to be read as broadly as the above examples suggest that it is.
A. CERCLA: A Remedial Statute
CERCLA is an ideal statute to use as a vehicle for analyzing the
theoretical bounds of the remedial purposes canon because it is both an
evidently remedial law and one with particularly confusing legislative
history.83 Most legislation of the "environmental decade" fits the first
77. See generally Margot J. Pollans, A 'Blunt Withdrawal"? Bars on Citizen Suits for Toxic
Site Cleanup, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441 (2013).
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)-(24) (2012); see also infra Section II.A.3 for more information
about the difference between remedial and removal actions.
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2012).
80. See infra Section II.B.
81. In fact, the language of the statute seems to suggest that there could be no challenges,
aside from the explicit exceptions, to removal or remedial actions ever. That is, there is nothing in
the statute that explicitly permits federal jurisdiction to challenges once removal or remedial
actions are completed. Still, commentators seem to think such challenges would be acceptable. See
Pollans, supra note 77, at 451 ("Polluters would have to wait until cleanup was done to bring
challenges."). And so did the enacting Congress. See H.R. REP. No. 99-962, at 224 (1986) (Conf.
Rep.) (stating that 113(h)(4), the section allowing citizen suits to proceed in limited circumstances,
was "not intended to preclude judicial review until the total response action is finished").
82. See Pollans, supra note 77, at 442 (noting that "[t]oxic site cleanup is ... [p]ainfully slow,"
and that "[t]he average cleanup takes twelve years and some take much longer.").
83. See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (1982) ("In the
instance of the "Superfund" legislation, a hastily assembled bill and a fragmented legislative
history add to the usual difficulty of discerning the full meaning of the law.").
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criteria. Commonly understood environmental problems were the
impetus for our major "media based" statutes (e.g., the Clean Air Act
and the Clean Water Act) as well as other targeted "issue" statutes (e.g.,
CERCLA's sister statute, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA")). What makes CERCLA a somewhat better vehicle for
analyzing the remedial purposes canon, and for comparison with the
ACA, is that while the issue the statute attempted to remedy was
obvious, Congress passed the bill in a particularly pressured, fly-by-
night way. As a result, Congress left a legislative history that muddies
the statute's otherwise clear remedial purpose. 84 This Section will
briefly discuss the primary impetus for the legislation as well as its
rushed passage.
1. The Love Canal Impetus
CERCLA was passed in response to public fears about
environmental disasters, but particularly in response to the "Love
Canal" catastrophe, "one of the most appalling environmental tragedies
in American history." 5 The story of Love Canal is terrible but fairly
simple. The remains of a failed canal project were used as a chemical
dumpsite for several decades. 86 In 1953, Hooker Chemical Company
covered the dump and sold the land to the city of Niagara Falls, New
York.87 Ultimately, over one hundred homes and a school were built
above the contaminated site.88 After unusually intense rain and
snowfall, the "environmental time bomb [went] off," and a toxic soup of
chemicals began to leach out of the ground and into the community.89
84. There are several parallels to the ACA. The issues that the ACA aimed to address were
fairly clear to most American voters after the 2008 election. See Robert J. Blendon et al., Voters
and Health Reform in the 2008 Presidential Election, NEW ENG. J. MED. (Nov. 6, 2008), http://www
.nejm.org/doilfull/10.1056[NEJMsrO8O7717#t=article [https://perma.cc/36CJ-GM6V] (noting that
voters "ranked health care third as an election issue"). And the mechanisms for solving those issues
had been debated by wonks and legislators for decades. See, e.g., Stuart M. Butler, Assuring
Affordable Health Care for All Americans, HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 1, 1989), http://www.heritage
.org/research/lecture/assuring-affordable-health-care-for-all-americans [https://perma.cclWJE8-
LBM9] (proposing an insurance mandate). But the complexity and rushed passage of the bill left
a confusing and easily manipulated legislative history. See generally John Cannan, A Legislative
History of the Affordable Care Act: How Legislative Procedure Shapes Legislative History, 105 L.
LIBR. J. 131 (2013).
85. Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, 5 EPA J. 17 (1979), http://www2.epa.gov/
aboutepallove-canal-tragedy [https://perma.cc/GY59-5FCU].
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Love Canal: Public Health Time Bomb, A Special Report to the Governor and
Legislature, OFF. PuB. HEALTH 3 (Sept. 1978), https://www.health.ny.gov/environmentall
investigations/love canal/1ctimbmb.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NGB-X3ES].
89. Id.
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This was not a purely local issue. In New York State's Health
Department Report to the Governor on the disaster, the authors wrote
that "Niagara Falls . .. has again become the focus of international
attention," and this time for something beyond its proximity to a
waterfall.90 That report described Love Canal as "a major human and
environmental tragedy without precedent and unparalleled in New
York State's history." 91 The horrors of Love Canal, which involved
"deadly chemicals oozing through the ground .. . burning children and
pets and . .. causing birth defects and miscarriages," led President
Jimmy Carter to declare an environmental emergency in the area in
1978.92
2. A "Whirlwind Adoption"
With a relatively environmentally friendly Congress, 93 this
seemed like a great time not to let a tragedy go to waste.94 On the other
hand, a general mood against perceived government overregulation was
working to change the status quo both in Washington and across the
country.95 The result was a lame duck Congress that wanted to quickly
pass a statute to deal with environmental disasters like Love Canal
before Reagan took office in 1981.96 The final year of Carter's presidency
thus saw the "whirlwind adoption"97 of what became CERCLA. To make
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Anthony DePalma, Love Canal Declared Clean, Ending Toxic Horror, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
18, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/18/nyregion/love-canal-declared-clean-ending-toxic-
horror.html [https://perma.cc/2A7B-VPXA].
93. See LETTIE M. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT 1-2 (1982) ("[N]o
politician could afford to ignore the demands being made by the [environmental] movement [in the
1970s].").
94. See Grad, supra note 83, at 1-2 (describing how Congress had been attempting to pass
toxic waste cleanup legislation for several years before the passage of CERCLA); id. at 7 (noting
that the committee report for S. 1480, which eventually became CERCLA, "[paid] particular
attention to Love Canal" and that "[i]t is not insignificant that the national election which changed
the composition of the Congress took place on November 4, 1980 [twenty days before the first
version of the bill was considered on the floor]").
95. See WENNER, supra note 93, at 33 (discussing how "[1]ater years [of the 1970s] were filled
with more critical debate over [various environmental policies"); Joseph DiMento, Asking God to
Solve Our Problems: Citizen Environmental Suit Legislation in the Western States, 2 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POLY 169, 184 (1982) (describing the 1970s as an "environmental decade" and
suggesting that perhaps the courts would be less amenable to environmental regulation in the
1980s); Kenneth T. Walsh, The Most Consequential Elections in History: Ronald Reagan and the
Election of 1980, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 25, 2008, 11:57 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/
2008/09/25/the-most-consequential-elections-in-history-ronald-reagan-and-the-election-of- 1980
[https://perma.cc/J6YA-H7DX].
96. See Grad, supra note 83, at 2-5.
97. Columbia River Serv. Corp. v. Gilman, 751 F. Supp. 1448, 1452 (W.D. Wash. 1990).
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an extremely complicated story short, the Senate ultimately presented
a bill in front of the House "on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, [and] the
House took [it] ... groaning all the way."9 8 The House's acquiescence to
the Senate's final version is the primary reason that the Senate Report
has become such an important tool for determining the legislative
history of CERCLA. 99 This aspect of CERLCA's passage also presents
an important similarity with the Affordable Care Act: that roughly one-
half of Congress opposed the final legislation.100 CERCLA and the
Affordable Care Act differ considerably in terms of their political
contentiousness, but they both, to a degree, present the same problem
regarding legislative history. The overall impetus behind each statute
is readily discernable, but is that the same as "legislative intent"? In
other words, can we really determine the intent of the legislature, when
in fact a legislature is a group of people with disparate needs, wants,
constituencies, or understandings of specific provisions? 01 CERCLA's
rushed passage resulted in many confusing provisions and statutory
gaps, but the principal problem this Note will address is the statute's
failure to deal with the delay caused by preliminary challenges to EPA
action.
3. Removals and Remedies: The Two Steps for a Mess
CERCLA "establish[ed] a two-level response mechanism" for
toxic-site cleanups consisting of "removal" actions and "remedial"
actions. 1 0 2 A removal action is the immediate action taken at a site after
98. Grad, supra note 83, at 1.
99. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 n.12 (2d Cir. 1985). See
generally S. REP. NO. 96-848 (1980).
100. No Republicans voted for the ACA. See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 165,
CLERK.HOUSE.GOV, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2010/ro1l65.xml (last visited Feb. 7, 2017)
[https://perma.cclY38D-2R5L]; U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress-1' Session, U.S.
SENATE (last visited Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll call_1ists/roll-call
votecfm.cfm?congress=111 &session=1&vote=00396 [https://perma.cc/6CM3-2RKQ].
Admittedly, this interpartisan disagreement is different than the intercameral disagreement that
accompanied the passage of CERCLA. But it still poses the same problems for determining a
single, unified "legislative intent."
101. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 376 (2012) ("[T]hat the
legislature even had a view on the matter at issue ... is pure fantasy. In the ordinary case, most
legislators could not possibly have focused on the narrow point before the court [and] the few who
did undoubtedly had varying views.").
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)-(24) (2012); Grad, supra note 83, at 11. But see Jerry L.
Anderson, Removal or Remedial? The Myth of CERCLA's Two-Response System, 18 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 103 (1993) (arguing that, while Congress intended a clear two-part process of immediate
removal action followed by longer-term remedial action, in practice the difference between
"removal" and "remedial" is often unclear).
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a release or threatened release. 103 They "have generally been thought
of as short-term, interim actions taken to prevent imminent harm and
to keep a release of contaminants from getting worse." 104 Removals, in
other words, were considered emergency response actions-something
authorities would need to do quickly in order to get a spill under
control.105 These are actions that were never intended to last long, and
whose delay could result in immediate harm to affected populations. 106
Remedial actions are longer-term actions designed to create a
permanent remedy at the contaminated site. 107 By statutory definition,
these actions can include a variety of intensive methods. 108 In addition
to being time and labor intensive, remedial actions can be remarkably
complex. 109 CERCLA itself does provide some guidance for how the EPA
should decide which remedial actions to take. For instance, the statute
compels the EPA to produce "remedial investigations and feasibility
studies," known as "RI/FS."110 But the statute provides virtually no
guidance as to what an RI/FS should entail."11 These types of studies,
used both to determine the impact of an action on the environment and
to develop alternatives, are familiar to practitioners and students of
environmental law. They are reminiscent of an Environmental Impact
Study ("EIS") mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"), 112 the bill that began the "environmental decade."113
103. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).
104. Anderson, supra note 102, at 103.
105. S. REP. No. 96-848, supra note 99, at 54 (" 'Removal' refers to actions which must proceed
without delay.").
106. Id. at 52 ("Removal may continue if immediately required to prevent, limit or mitigate
an emergency; there is an immediate risk; and such assistance on a timely basis will not otherwise
be provided." (emphasis added)).
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24); S. REP. No. 96-848, supra note 99, at 52 ("Remedial actions may
be undertaken after removal actions have consumed 6 months. . . ." (emphasis added)); Anderson,
supra note 102, at 103 ("Remedial action ... refers to the permanent remedy for a site, which
generally comprises long-term treatment or containment of the hazardous substances."). Despite
Anderson's claim that the line between removal and remedial actions is blurry, EPA internally
continues to stand by the idea that remedial actions are "permanent." See RCRA Corrective Action
Training Program: Getting to YES!, EPA 9 (Nov. 2009), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2016-04/documents/mod5.pdf [https://perma.cc/WVK7-WFN8].
108. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) ("The term includes . . . perimeter protection using dikes ...
dredging or excavations ... onsite treatment or incineration . . . .").
109. See, e.g., C.N. Mulligan et al., Remediation Technologies for Metal-Contaminated Soils
and Groundwater: An Evaluation, 60 ENGINEERING GEOLOGY 193 (May 30, 2001), http://www
.sciencedirect.com/science/article/piilS0013795200001010 [https://perma.cc/4HWY-26CS].
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 9616(d) (2012).
111. See Frey v. U.S. EPA, 937 F. Supp. 2d 964, 965 (S.D. Ind. 2013) ("CERCLA does not
define nor describe what should be included in an RIJFS.").
112. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
113. See 42 U.S.C § 4332 (2012); WENNER, supra note 93, at 1.
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Ordinarily, agency actions of such consequence as determining a
potentially decades-long remediation process 1 14 would be open to
challenges that the agency had not considered alternatives or conducted
proper research. The later section 113(h) amendment, however,
precludes not only review of an RI/FS, but also a challenge to any EIS
the EPA may have made. 115
B. A Remedy for the Remedies? The SARA Amendments and 113(h)
If CERCLA is a classically remedial statute, 11 6 then the SARA is
perhaps the ultimate remedial statute: in 1986, Congress acted
specifically to fix certain problems of a statute that was itself designed
specifically to fix certain problems. One of several issues left unresolved
after the hurried passage of CERCLA was the timing of litigation.
Essentially, CERCLA drafters sought to allow the EPA the discretion
to quickly and adequately respond to environmental disasters, 117 but
challenges to EPA action in the courts had the potential to seriously
delay response times.118 Legislators were thus faced with creating a
remedy for the remedies-that is, a statutory remedy for the problem
that confronted the EPA's remedial action at contaminated sites. The
then-recent, horrible incident in Bhopal, India, made rapid response a
primary goal when Congress drafted and passed the SARA
amendments. 119 In response to the perceived dangers of delayed EPA
action, Congress included section 113(h) in the SARA amendments,
114. See Pollans, supra note 77.
115. Id. at 454 (discussing how section 113(h) has been applied inter-statutorily).
116. See Watson, supra note 60, at 271-72 (describing how CERCLA "approximates the 'best-
case scenario' for the [remedial purposes] canon's application").
117. One of the "basic elements of the bill" was "providing ample Federal response authority
to help clean up hazardous chemical disasters." Grad, supra note 83, at 8-9 (citing S. REP. NO. 96-
848, supra note 99, at 13).
118. See McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d 325, 329 (9th Cir. 1995)
("Section 113(h) protects the execution of a CERCLA plan ... from lawsuits that might interfere
with the expeditious cleanup effort.").
119. See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, Vol. 2
(1986), reprinted in COMM. ON ENV'T & PUB. WORKS, 101ST CONG. 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1986, at 409 (1990)
(statement of Sen. Lautenberg) ("The recent tragedy in Bhopal, India, raises several critical issues
relevant to the reauthorization of Superfund."); see also id. at 515 (questions prepared by Sen.
Simpson for Assistant Attorney General Henry Habicht) ("EPA has emphasized the need for rapid
clean-up as a primary goal. You have also suggested that anything that slows clean-up, no matter
how well-intended, could inadvertently increase the risk to public health that led the nation to
decide to undertake the Superfund in the first place."). For more background on the Bhopal
disaster, see Alan Taylor, Bhopal: The World's Worst Industrial Disaster, 30 Years Later, ATLANTIC
(Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/12/bhopal-the-worlds-worst-industrial-
disaster-30-years-later/100864/ [https://perma.cc/K6NW-9ZWGI.
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intending it to be a comprehensive firewall for litigation prior to the
completion of cleanups by the EPA. 120
Section 113(h) states that "[n]o Federal court shall have
jurisdiction under federal law . . . to review any challenges to removal
or remedial action selected [by the EPA] or to review any order
[requiring a private party to engage in removal or remedial action], in
any action," except under certain specific conditions, including various
actions to recover costs.121 This provision has been read as broadly as
possible to prevent any challenges to EPA action until all clean up
efforts, including removal and remedial actions, have ended. 122 This
Note explores the possibility that judges read around the apparently
plain language preventing challenges to remedial actions, and instead
read the statute as: "[n]o Federal court shall have jurisdiction under
federal law . .. to review any challenges to removal action selected [by
the EPA]."123 Admittedly, the plain language of the statute suggests
that Congress intended this provision to be a firewall against challenges
to removal or remedial actions. But the plain language of CERCLA is
not always clear. 124 And the legislative history of section 113(h)
suggests that there may have been some competing interpretations. 125
There are at least two reasons to think that Congress did not
intend for section 113(h) to be expansive enough to bar any litigation
regarding a cleanup until the EPA was completely done. First, it is
likely that Congress simply did not understand how long remedial
actions would take. At the time that SARA was passed, Love Canal had
been undergoing cleanup efforts for roughly six years, and the EPA had
officially been working at the site under the authority of CERCLA for
just three years. 126 It would be another thirteen years before "remedy
construction" was completed. 127 Remedy construction "is the phase in
120. See Cabot Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 677 F. Supp. 823, 827 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (quoting comments
by Sen. Thurmond in the legislative history).
121. See id. (discussing how section 9613(h) covers the EPA's cleanup activities that comply
with SARA).
122. See Pollans, supra note 77, at 443 (explaining that federal courts decline to hear citizen
suits that are barred by CERCLA).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2012) (emphasis added).
124. See infra Section II.C (discussing interpretation of seemingly plain language in
CERCLA).
125. See LIGHT, supra note 75, at 25 (discussing the comments of Rep. Glickman regarding
Sen. Stafford's interpretations of 113(h)); id. at 170 ("The legislative history of [113(h)] is extremely
controversial.").
126. EPA Superfund Program Profile: Love Canal, Niagara Falls, NY, EPA,
https://cumulis.epa.gov/supercpad/cursites/csitinfo.cfm?id=0201290 (last visited Aug. 30, 2016)
[https://perma.ce/35YX-WYWJ].
127. See id.
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Superfund site cleanup where the actual remedy . . . is built"128-it is
not even necessarily the end of "remedial action," the point at which
section 113(h) would theoretically allow for litigation to proceed. 129 Love
Canal was not delisted from the National Priorities List, an event that
surely would mark the end of "remedial action," until 2004-twenty-six
years after Jimmy Carter first declared the site to be an environmental
disaster, and eighteen years after Congress passed SARA. 130 The
federal government had not engaged in this type of environmental
disaster remediation before, at least on this scale, and the congressmen
who wrote and passed SARA may not have understood just how long
remediation would take.
Second, section 113(h) has been read to bar any litigation,
including citizen suits, until after all remedial action has been
completed. 131 There is a specific exception for citizen suits; 1 32 however,
the language does not allow for a challenge to a removal action when
remedial action "is to be undertaken at the site." 133 The enacting
Congress was very aware of the utility of citizen suit provisions in
environmental enforcement statutes. 134 It appears as though the
principal harm that Congress was attempting to address with section
113(h) was the use of abusive litigation by polluters to delay
cleanups, 135 not the abusive use of litigation by citizen groups. While
128. Glossary for the Superfund Site Profile, EPA https://cumulis.epa.gov/supercpad/
SiteProfiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=modules.glossary&id=0 (last visited Aug. 30, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/FXW8-YTZL].
129. See id. (defining "remedial action" as "[tlhe actual construction or implementation phase
of a Superfund site cleanup that follows remedial design"). As noted previously, the literal
language of section 113(h) would appear to preclude challenges even after the remedial action is
completed. See supra note 81.
130. See DePalma, supra note 92 (reporting that Love Canal was finally declared clean in
2004). The National Priorities List is the official list of priority sites for toxic and hazardous
releases. Superfund: National Priorities List, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-
national-priorities-list-npl (last visited Feb. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/BG3D-UFTS].
131. See Pollans, supra note 77, at 443 (stating that courts have "almost uniformly" construed
CERCLA as a bar to suits related to any site where remediation is ongoing).
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1)-(3) (2012) (excepting suits seeking contribution or
reimbursement or enforcing orders under other provisions of the title).
133. Id. § 9613(h)(4).
134. See Stephen Fotis, Private Enforcement of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, 35
AM. U. L. REV. 127, 131-37 (1985) (discussing how Congress's enactment of the Clean Air Act and
Clean Water Act, both passed less than a decade before CERCLA, "embrace[d] [the] tradition of
citizen participation as an important tool"); see also Pollans, supra note 77, at 446-51 (discussing
CERCLA's citizen suit provision in the context of other environmental statute citizen suit
provisions).
135. See Pollans, supra note 77, at 450-51 (explaining that "Section 113(h) codified an
approach courts had already begun taking in response to polluter recalcitrance" and that in
"CERCLA's early years, polluters often tried to evade liability (or, at least, minimize response
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the unintended consequence of barring citizen suits does not compel the
judicial revision this Note suggests, 136 shutting the courthouse doors to
citizen suits demonstrates that the enacting Congress may not have
understood the broad sweep of this provision. The Conference Report,
for instance, states that section 113(h)(4), regarding removing
jurisdiction in citizen suit challenges, "is not intended to preclude
judicial review until the total response action is finished," 137 something
its plain language compels (assuming there is "remedial action . .. to be
undertaken at the site").138 The enacting Congress's general naivete,
however, is demonstrated by the fact that the Conference Report added
the following caveat: review would be acceptable before the "total
response action is finished if the response proceeds in distinct and
separate stages." 139 Not only does the enacted language not reflect that
caveat, but later cases would demonstrate that determining the exact
contours of when a discrete remedial action ends and another begins, or
even when a removal action ends and a remedial action begins, is no
easy task. 140 In other words, citizen suits were commonly employed in
environmental statutes at the time SARA was passed, and the enacting
Congress did not seem to want this jurisdiction-stripping provision to
prevent citizen suits. But they still wrote a provision that did just that.
This context suggests that they may not have carefully considered the
literal language of section 113(h).
One very early interpretation of section 113(h) did involve
reading around its plain language. 14 1 Cabot Corp. v. EPA held that
section 113(h) did apply to both removal and remedial actions, but that
the provision allowed an inherent exception for challenges alleging an
irreversible harm to human health and the environment, as opposed to
citizen suit challenges claiming monetary damages. 1 4 2 The judge in
costs) by challenging government cleanup plans before they were implemented") (emphasis
added)).
136. That is, one could read the statute to allow citizen suits but still bar challenges by PRPs
until after removal or remedial action is completed.
137. H.R. REP. No. 99-962, at 224 (1986).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4); see also Cabot Corp. v. EPA, 677 F. Supp. 823, 826 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(holding that section 113(h) barred a challenge by a citizen group until all cleanup had ceased at
the site).
139. H.R. REP. NO. 99-962, at 224.
140. See Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1334 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that the government
was still in the process of planning remedial actions at the site decades after they had initially
become aware that the site was contaminated). See generally Anderson, supra note 102 (discussing
how Congress has, without providing guidance on how to do so, emphasized the need to distinguish
remedial actions from removal actions).
141. Cabot Corp., 677 F. Supp. at 823.
142. See id. at 829 (discussing how irreparable harms alleged in a suit should be reviewed
promptly).
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Cabot Corp. read the statute remedially to bar the plaintiffs in that
particular action, who were really potentially responsible parties
("PRPs") suing under "the guise of citizens," but left open the possibility
of allowing a "typical citizen suit." 14 3 In Cabot Corp., therefore, the court
decided the case according to the letter of the law of section 113(h)-the
judge denied jurisdiction over a citizen suit because a removal or
remedial action had not been completed at the site. 144 One can wonder,
however, what the outcome would have been if the posture of the case
had been different-namely, if the plaintiffs had been engaged in a
typical citizen suit alleging irreparable harm to the environment. In
that case, if the judge had held true to his statements that there was an
implicit exception for irreversible harm, he would have essentially been
employing the same solution this Note considers: that the enacting
Congress could not possibly have meant what they said, 145 and
therefore a judge should just read around the mistake.
The flexible approach outlined in Cabot Corp. has failed to take
hold. Section 113(h) has been so strictly applied that it has even
prevented the federal government from recovering costs for a cleanup
while the cleanup was ongoing 146-presumably not the outcome the
original drafters were intending. One potential reason is the closing of
the courthouse doors to citizen suits generally, and primarily through
statutory interpretation. 14 7 This inflexibility has had consequences
outside of the realm of potential CERCIA litigation. 1 48 The broad
wording of section 113(h) has led courts to apply the jurisdictional ban
to suits under other statutes. 149 That is, litigants who sue the EPA
under CERLCA's companion statute, RCRA, or even under more
143. Id. at 828-29.
144. Id. at 829.
145. See id. (discussing the legislative history and how certain members of Congress saw a
clear difference between more typical citizen suits and citizen suits that are simply a guise for
PRPs to challenge agency action).
146. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 750 F. Supp. 832, 835-36 (W.D. Mich.
1990) (dismissing a counterclaim because of section 113(h)'s limits on judicial review of EPA
actions).
147. See Pollans, supra note 77, at 442-43. One possible reason is that judges might be more
willing to strictly apply a statutory provision when it helps alleviate their caseload, which, for
federal judges at the district court level, has risen at least thirty-nine percent since 1990. See
Caseload Increases Stress Need for New Federal Judgeships, U.S. COURTS (Sept. 10, 2013),
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/09/10/caseload-increases-stress-need-new-federal-judgeships
[https://perma.cclM8UQ-N-R3R].
148. See Pollans supra note 77, at 452 (stating that "CERCLA's preclusion provision is unique
because it is not, on its face, limited to causes of action brought under CERCLA itself').
149. See id. at 442-43 (discussing how courts read section 113(h) broadly and apply it
regardless of the plaintiff or the underlying cause of action).
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disparate legislation such as NEPA, are still barred from getting into
court until removal or remedial action is complete.150
While the differences between CERCIA and the Affordable Care
Act, both in substance and legislative history, are many, there are three
important similarities to consider as we compare the Court's approach
in King to a similar approach regarding section 113(h): (1) both statutes
set out to solve clear and publicly understood problems; (2) both
employed unclear, or certainly less publicly understood, mechanisms to
fix those problems; and (3) both were passed in odd, rushed manners
that confuse the legislative record. In this sense, section 113(h) of the
SARA amendments is very similar to section 1401 of the ACA: the broad
purpose of SARA (and CERCLA generally) is obvious, but the purpose
of section 113(h) is less clear. Both SARA section 113(h) and ACA
section 1401 raise the same question of whether judges should rely on
the broad purpose of the law when confronted with a seemingly
anomalous specific provision. Furthermore, CERCLA and SARA make
for an excellent foil with which to investigate the limits of remedial
reading because the public and courts have long considered them
explicitly remedial 51 and because Congress most definitely made some
mistakes. 152
C. The Remedial Purposes Canon and CERCLA
While reading a word entirely out of a statute may seem like a
drastic measure, such drastic reworkings of language in CERCLA are
actually somewhat commonplace given its history. Environmental
legislation generally is easily comprehended as remedial in nature, 153
and CERCLA in particular has been read as "overwhelmingly
remedial."15 4 Courts have regularly read around seemingly plain
language to effect what they believe to be the remedial purpose of the
statute. 15 5 The following two sections briefly describe two such
150. See id. ("[S]ection 113(h) strips federal courts of jurisdiction ovor claims arising under
various other federal laws including the National Historic Preservation Act, the National
Environmental Policy Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act in addition to RCRA and
CERCLA.").
151. See Watson, supra note 60, at 271-72 (describing how CERCLA "approximates the 'best-
case scenario' for the [remedial purposes] canon's application").
152. See, e.g., infra Sections II.C.1 and II.C.2, (demonstrating how courts have construed the
statute in accordance with its remedial purpose despite its plain language).
153. See Watson, supra note 60, at 258 ("[Cjourts have included environmental statutes in
the category of remedial legislation.").
154. Id. at 263 (emphasis added) (citing various cases).
155. See id. at 266 (describing instances in which use of the remedial purpose canon in
CERCLA cases have been justified).
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instances when courts have read around the plain language of
CERCLA.
1. Owners and Operators
CERCLA's remedial purpose can be stated in two parts: "(1) to
clean up hazardous waste sites promptly and effectively; and (2) to
ensure that those responsible for the problem bear the costs and
responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created."156
Crucial to the second part is finding who exactly "those responsible" are.
CERCLA lays out four categories of parties who are potentially
responsible, the aptly named "potentially responsible parties" or
"PRPs." 15 7 The determination of whether a party is a PRP is immensely
important because CERCLA's liability scheme is joint, several, strict,
and retroactive. 15 8 If you are deemed a PRP, you may be on the hook for
the entire cost of cleanup operations that can regularly run millions of
dollars, 15 9 even if other parties contributed significantly, and even if the
spill was caused decades earlier. 160 If you are not one of the four defined
PRPs, you pay nothing. 161
One might think, considering the importance of the question,
that the drafters of CERCLA would have taken special care to precisely
define exactly who would fall under the category of a PRP. Not quite.
While the language defining PRPs seems clear, Congress, at least
156. Id. at 203 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
157. See 42 U.S.C § 9607(a) (2012) (delineating four circumstances in which one maybe liable
for certain costs and damages); Owen T. Smith, The Expansive Scope of Liable Parties Under
CERCLA, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 821, 822 (1989) (discussing how the EPA usually designates a PRP
with "deep pockets" to implement a cleanup).
158. The statutory language of CERCLA regarding its liability is another example of awkward
drafting and judicial interpretation. Even though CERCLA liability is universally understood as
being joint, several, strict, and retroactive, the law itself does not say so. Rather, 'liability" is
defined as "the standard of liability which obtains under section 311 of the [Clean Water Act]," 42
U.S.C. § 9601(32) (2012), which itself nowhere uses the word "strict." See 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2012).
To determine the parameters of liability under CERCLA, then, courts looked to the legislative
history, which demonstrates that the general understanding at the time of passage was that
Section 311 of the Clean Water Act, pertaining to oil spills, imposed strict liability. See New York
v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Congress intended that responsible
parties be held strictly liable [and] Congress understood [Section 311 of the Clean Water Act] to
impose such liability.").
159. See James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, How Costly Is "Clean'? An Analysis of the
Benefits and Costs of Superfund Site Remediations, 18 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 2, 4 (1999)
(average cost of removal operations is five hundred thousand dollars); id. at 13 (average cost of
remedial operations is $18.1 million).
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (providing liability under CERCLA for PRPs by time or
causation).
161. Under CERCLA. See id. You may or may not be liable under state tort law.
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according to the courts that have interpreted this provision, did a poor
job of saying what they meant.
PRPs are defined in section 107, and they come in four varieties:
(1) "the owner and operator" of a facility where there has been a release
of hazardous substances, (2) "any person who . .. owned or operated" a
facility when there was a release, (3) persons who arranged for the
disposal of hazardous waste, and (4) persons who transported the
hazardous waste. 16 2 The boundary between "owner" and "operator" can
be quite complex, 163 but for the sake of simplicity we can take it at face
value. That is, an owner is a person who owns the facility, and an
operator is a person who actually operates the facility on a day-to-day
basis. With that distinction in mind, one can see the logic of these four
categories. People who arranged for the disposal of, or transported,
hazardous substances should be liable when that arrangement or
transportation goes poorly. People who owned or operated a facility at
which there was a release of hazardous substances should be liable for
mismanagement; in this way the harsh liability of CERCLA would
serve to incentivize owners (who do not operate facilities) to require
better management practices from operators. Lastly, to account for the
particularly harsh nature of retroactive liability, the plain language of
CERCLA would hold accountable those who operate facilities even for
releases that occurred decades before they began operating the site, but
only if they are both owners and operators of that facility.
Beyond this reasonable statutory scheme, the language is quite
clear. Not only is "and/or" a particularly well known difference among
legal writers,1 64 section 107(a)(1) also employs the definite article "the"
and singular terms for owner and operator. 165 "Owners and operators"
could reasonably be read to mean "either an owner or an operator"
("friends and family," for example, does not connote only family with
whom you are friendly), and early interpreters of the statute seemed to
read section 107(a)(1) in that manner. 166 But "the owner and operator"
strongly suggests a discrete someone who is both owner and operator.
Furthermore, one does not need to employ even the whole act canon-
162. Id. (emphasis added).
163. And well known to Corporate Law students. See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524
U.S. 51, 62-66 (1998) (discussing the difficulty in defining what constitutes "operation" and
"ownership" for liability purposes under CERCLA).
164. See, e.g., Bryan A. Garner, Ax These Terms from Your Legal Writing, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1,
2014, 8:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ax-these-terms-from-your_1egal
-writing/ [https://perma.cc/CL5C-H3LP].
165. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (referring to "the owner and operator" (emphasis added)).
166. See Grad, supra note 83, at 9 ("Liability is imposed on owners and operators of vessels or
facilities. . . .").
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that words or phrases should be read the same way throughout an
act1 67-but only the whole subsection canon to see that Congress was
fully capable of writing "owne[r] or operat[or]" when they meant it.168
Armed with the clear statutory language and an eminently plausible
reason for this statutory structure, you might expect that courts would
have stuck to the plain language of section 107(a). You would be wrong.
Courts have universally held that owners or operators of a
facility are liable for releases of hazardous substances at that facility,
at any time, under section 107(a)(1).1 69 This understanding of the law
was so dominant that an American Bar Association Primer for "Young
Lawyers" from 1995 explains that there are four classes of defendants
outlined in CERCLA, the first being "present 'owners or operators, "-
a clear misquotation of the statute.170 Courts were willing to overlook
clear language in their search for responsible parties.1 71 That is, courts
were willing to essentially rewrite a particularly important section of
the law in order to give effect to the remedial purpose of the statute.
Courts were similarly willing to overlook specific, albeit far less clear,
language regarding who can sue for contribution after a cleanup, in
order to further a different goal of CERCLA: prioritizing voluntary
cleanups of contaminated sites.1 72
167. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 830 (3d ed. 2001)
(discussing how the Supreme Court has adhered to the whole act rule when interpreting statutes
since its earliest cases).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2); accord King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2499 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("It is common sense that any speaker who says 'Exchange' some of the time, but
'Exchange established by the State' the rest of the time, probably means something by the
contrast."). Furthermore, even the editors of the U.S.C.A. knew when Congress really meant "or,"
and they failed to suggest such a change in section 107(a)(1). See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(10) (2012) n.1
(West 2015) (suggesting that the original drafters meant to write "or" when they wrote "of').
169. See United States v. Argent Corp., No. CIV 83-0523 BB, 1984 WL 2567, at *2 (D.N.M.
May 4, 1984), for an early example of this interpretation. See, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper
& Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 841 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Responsible persons include the current 'owner' or
'operator' of the facility. . . ." (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9706(a)(1))); New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,
759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Section 9706(a)(1) applies to all current owners and
operators . . . .").
170. AM. BAR ASS'N, YOUNG LAWYERS Div., CERCLA PRIMER 1 (Susan Wiens & Lisa Keyes
eds., 1995).
171. See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982)
("To give effect to ... congressional concerns, CERCLA should be given a broad and liberal
construction. The statute should not be narrowly interpreted to . . . limit the liability of those
responsible for cleanup costs . . . .").
172. See Nurad, 966 F.2d at 840 (mentioning "CERCLA's goal of encouraging voluntary
cleanup").
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2. What's a Contribution?
CERCLA set out to accomplish its supposed task of incentivizing
voluntary cleanups with a carrot and a stick. The stick was that
government cleanups are generally very expensive, and much more
expensive than private cleanups. Therefore, if the government
commences an action and sends you the bill, you are probably going to
be looking at significantly more costs than if you had commenced the
cleanup voluntarily. The carrot was that parties who cleaned up their
own mess could seek contribution from other PRPs. 173 Therefore, a
person who was in any way responsible for a release of hazardous
materials could begin cleaning up the site, thus saving themselves the
added cost that would be incurred if the government cleaned up the site,
and could then sue other PRPs to recover costs for the operation. 174
CERCLA originally provided no specific instructions on when a
contribution action could be commenced,175 leaving district courts to
determine the parameters of a contribution action after a voluntary
cleanup. Many courts determined that, given the generally assumed
goal of incentivizing voluntary cleanups, PRPs who voluntarily cleaned
up a site could indeed sue other PRPs for contribution. 176 In SARA,
Congress specified exactly who could sue for contribution, 7 7 but did not
explicitly ratify the approach taken by district courts prior to 1986.
Rather, the Ninety-Ninth Congress added section 113(f)(1), which
stated that "[a]ny person may seek contribution from any [PRP], during
or following any civil action under section 9606 [actions brought by the
government to force cleanups or recover cost] . . . or under section
9607(a) [actions brought by other PRPs]."1 78 Then, confusingly,
Congress added a savings clause: "Nothing in this subsection shall
diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in
the absence of a civil action under section 9606. . . or section 9607."179
173. Or at least, many courts assumed this was possible, and many firms took advantage of
this carrot. See Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 162 (2004) (citing various district
court cases allowing a party to sue for contribution).
174. Id.
175. See H.R. Res. 7020, 96th Cong. § 113 (1980) (found on page 147).
176. See Cooper, 543 U.S. at 162 ("CERCLA did not mention the word 'contribution,' [but
many courts held that] such a right arose either impliedly from provisions of the statute, or as a
matter of federal common law."); Ben McIntosh, When Policy Trumps the Text: How Ambiguous
Statutes Allow the Courts An Opportunity to Further Congressional Intent, 12 Mo. ENVTL. L &
POL'Y REV. 210, 213 (2005) ("[S]ome district courts interpreted CERCLA to imply a right of action
for contribution.").
177. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2012).
179. Id.
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While courts had broadly agreed that because of the ultimate goal of
prompting cleanups, CERCLA must have allowed for some contribution
action prior to SARA;180 after SARA, there was some confusion about
who could bring such an action, or when. 181
There are basically two ways of reading this provision. One is to
give the savings clause supremacy over the operative clause, but then
the provision is meaningless. It would essentially read: "Any person can
sue for contribution during or after an action by the government or a
PRP to recover cost, but any person can also sue for contribution at any
time." To give effect to every word of the statute, the only sensible, if
strained, reading is that section 113(f)(1) does limit contribution actions
to persons during or after specific actions, and the savings clause
merely states that section 113(f)(1) does not diminish a person's general
right to contribution that may, or may not, exist outside of section
113(f)(1).182 This is a relatively simple interpretive issue, and yet, courts
were split on what section 113(f)(1) meant.
The reason for this confusion is that the courts read remedially.
In the face of even mild ambiguity, many courts found ways to give
voluntary PRPs a chance to recover costs through contribution actions
because that furthers the generally understood goal of incentivizing
voluntary cleanups of hazardous spills.183 Eighteen years after SARA's
passage, the Supreme Court, in a fairly surprising move, ruled that
voluntary PRPs were not able to sue for contribution. 184 And, even after
this decidedly nonremedial decision by Justice Thomas, the Court
waited only a few years before revisiting the issue and finding a work-
around so that voluntary PRPs could recover costs.185 With "owners or
operators" it seems that the Supreme Court has just decided to let the
remedial reading stand. In the case of section 113(f)(1), the Supreme
Court decided to step in, only to walk back their decision. The impetus
to read CERCLA remedially, regardless of the language, seems to be
overwhelming.
180. McIntosh, supra note 176, at 213 ("[1M]any courts believed that a right of contribution
existed under CERCLA, but there was no consensus on where that right came from.").
181. Id. at 214.
182. See Cooper, 543 U.S. at 166-67 (discussing how to interpret the statute to avoid
rendering it superfluous).
183. See id. at 162 (citing cases).
184. Id.
185. See United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 139-40 (2007) (holding that
section 9607(a)(4)(B) complemented section 9613(f) and created a cause of action for cost recovery
to PRPs).
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III. WHEN To BE REMEDIAL?:
COMPARING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND CERCLA
This Part will examine the possibility of judges reading
"remedial" out of the jurisdiction stripping provision section 113(h), and
it will do so by posing a question: What makes such a dramatic
interpretation of this law unacceptable if a similarly dramatic
interpretation of a statute was acceptable in King? Or, put differently,
what are the limits of the remedial purposes canon? Having
demonstrated that courts have been willing to work around fairly plain
language in CERCLA, we can turn to arguments about why they should
or should not be so willing when it comes to section 113(h). This Note's
primary goal is to test the limits of remedial interpretation by
comparing what the Court did in King with what courts may do
regarding section 113(h). Therefore, this Part will look to three
ostensible differences between the issue in King and the issue (or
issues) with section 113(h) to see if there are good reasons that a court
might follow King but not judicially revise section 113(h): (1) that
Congress would likely never fix the language in the Affordable Care Act,
and might fix section 113(h); (2) that the language in King presented a
"major question"; and (3) that the language at issue in King was more
clearly contrary to the intention of the enacting Congress.
A. A Friendly Congress?
The simplest solution to a congressional mistake, either a mere
scrivener's error or a misunderstanding of policy consequences, is to
have Congress fix that mistake. In his dissent in King, Justice Scalia
presented this solution quite clearly:
If Congress values above everything else the Act's applicability across the country, it could
make tax credits available in every Exchange. If it prizes state involvement in the Act's
implementation, it could continue to limit tax credits to state Exchanges while taking
other steps to mitigate the economic consequences predicted by the Court. 1 8 6
It is hard, however, to see Scalia giving this charge with a straight face
to a Congress that was famously unproductive and, at least in part,
famously anti-ACA.18 7 It is possible that Justice Roberts upheld the
186. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2506 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Transcript
of Oral Argument at 56, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114) ("You really think
Congress is just going to sit there while-while all of these disastrous consequences ensue ...
Congress adjusts, enacts a statute that-that takes care of the problem. It happens all the time.
Why is that not going to happen here?").
187. See Murray, supra note 3 (highlighting the low productivity of the 113th Congress as
measured by the number of public bills enacted into law); Wermiel, supra note 12 (discussing the
impact of congressional intent on the statutory interpretation question at the center of King); see
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IRS's interpretation because he was not willing to risk six million people
losing tax credits, and a nearly three hundred percent increase in
premiums 188 on the possibility that this Congress would "mitigate the
economic consequences."18 9 Should a judge be more willing to leave a
congressional error in place when he believes there is a greater chance
of Congress cleaning up their own mess?
As it relates to section 113(h), this question may be moot because
it is not exactly clear that the current Congress plans on tackling the
jurisdictional problems of 113(h) anytime soon. Commentators have
recognized the general problem of the overbroad nature of section
113(h) since shortly after Congress passed the SARA amendments, 190
and calls for congressional action on the issue are just as old. 191 In the
nearly three decades since SARA, Congress has amended various
provisions of CERCIA several times but has not touched section
113(h).1 92 There is little doubt that the ACA was a significantly more
contentious piece of legislation than SARA (or CERCLA). But, Congress
also Jeffrey Toobin, Did John Roberts Tip His Hand?, NEW YORKER (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www
.newyorker.comlnews/daily-comment/did-john-roberts-tip-his-hand [https://perma.cc/Z93G-
XQQYJ ("[Alny half-aware student of the contemporary Congress knows, there is no chance at all-
none-that this Congress will amend or improve the Affordable Care Act to save subsidies.").
188. See State-by-State Effects of a Ruling for the Challengers in King v. Burwell, KAISER FAM.
FOUND., http://kff.org/interactive/king-v-burwell-effects/ [https://perma.ccJLV82-8F7S]
(estimating the increase in average premium as a result of the tax credit not being available as
287 percent).
189. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia, it seems, would put that
pragmatism beyond the ken of a federal judge. In the first two pages of the majority opinion alone,
Roberts cites twice to an amicus brief written by economic scholars as well as to a report entitled
"The Impact of Guaranteed Issue and Community Rating Reforms on States." See id. at 2485-86
(citing Brief for Bipartisan Economic Scholars in Support of Respondents, King v. Burwell, 135 S.
Ct. 2480 (2015), (No. 14-114), 2015 WL 393821 at *11-12, *19-20; Leigh Wachenheim & Hans
Leida, The Impact of Guaranteed Issue and Community Rating Reforms on States' Individual
Insurance Markets, AM'S HEALTH INS. PLANS 38 (Mar. 2012), http://www.statecoverage.org/
files/Updated-Milliman-ReportGIandCommRatingMarch_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/KAL8-
REYV]). Scalia, on the other hand, did not cite an amicus brief, report, or law review article in his
entire opinion.
190. See Michael P. Healy, Judicial Review and CERCLA Response Actions: Interpretive
Strategies in the Face of Plain Meaning, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1993) (acknowledging the
broad nature of the provision and discussing subsequent attempts by courts to apply its plain
meaning).
191. See id. at 94 (arguing for a congressional amendment to 113(h)).
192. See, e.g., Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and
Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-74, tit. IV, § 427, 113 Stat. 1095 (1999);
Transportation Laws Codification, Pub. L. No. 104-287, § 6(j)(1), 110 Stat. 3400 (1996); Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. A, tit. I, § 101(a), tit. II, § 211(b), tit.
IV, § 2502(b), 110 Stat. 3009-41, 3009-464 (1996); Pub. L. No. 100-707, tit. I, § 109(v), 102 Stat.
4710 (1988); Pub. L. No. 103-429, § 7(e)(1), 108 Stat. 4390 (1994); Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-707, 102 Stat. 4689.
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has been particularly inactive lately, 1 9 3 and that fact may cause a judge
to wonder about the feasibility of Congress passing any necessary
legislation, regardless of the political temperature. Furthermore, the
increasingly partisan political climate perhaps makes certain issues
that might not have otherwise been considered contentious harder to
deal with. 194 One of the central questions regarding the remedial limits
of judicial interpretation is how, if at all, congressional inactivity or
obstinacy affects those limits. If we are prepared to say that the
Supreme Court was reasonable in judicially revising the ACA because
sending it back to Congress would be a nonstarter, then we should be
prepared to say that, as a result of increasing congressional
dysfunction, litigants wishing to challenge EPA decisionmaking with
regard to a remedial action should have their day in court, contrary to
the plain language of section 113(h). Put differently, the recalcitrance
vel non of Congress may not be a satisfactory way of determining the
limits of the remedial purposes canon. In an era of increased
polarization and congressional inactivity, if judges were to remedially
read around the plain language of a statute simply because Congress
would be unlikely to fix their own assumed mistake, then judges would
be employing such remedial readings on a very frequent basis.
B. A Major Question?
Chief Justice Roberts, in his majority opinion in King, did not
state his reasoning as "Congress probably didn't mean this, they
probably wouldn't fix it, and holding them to their word would be really
bad." He did, however, rely on the "major questions" doctrine. 195 How
"major" a question is, or really how "major" the impact would be if a
judge held Congress to their word, is, however, a poor criterion for when
to read remedially. The doctrine makes some sense in the context of
ambiguity, but not in the context of a true congressional error, as the
"established by the State" language in the ACA or Section 113(h) in
SARA may have been.
193. See Murray, supra note 3 (comparing the productivity of the 113th Congress to that of
previous congresses).
194. See Nick Gass, This Graphic Shows How America's Partisan Divide Grew, POLITICO (Apr.
24, 2015, 8:35 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/04/graphic-data-america-partisan-divide-
growth-117312 [https://perma.cclH9ZK-7BN8] ("[Researchers'] biggest concern is that the hyper-
partisan environment has stymied the legislative body's ability to come up with new policy
solutions to fix the United States' problems.").
195. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015).
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The major questions doctrine dates back to the Court's decision
in Brown & Williamson.196 In that case, various tobacco companies
challenged a Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") rule that defined
tobacco as a "drug" and cigarettes as a "device" under the Food, Drug
and Cosmetics Act ("FDCA"), and thus subjected cigarettes to
regulation. 19 7 The Court determined that, while Congress delegated the
general question of what constitutes a drug or a device to the FDA, the
decision to regulate the entire tobacco industry was such a major
question that it is unreasonable to think Congress would have
delegated it to the agency.198 To put their decision in the language of
Chevron,199 the Court found the terms "drug" and "device" sufficiently
ambiguous to suggest that Congress intended the FDA to define those
terms, but held that the FDA's definition was so impactful that it was
unreasonable to assume Congress delegated a decision of such
consequence. 200 The agency's interpretation passed Chevron step one,
but deference to the agency in Chevron step two was a bridge too far.
The question of whether "established by the State" forecloses the
provision of tax credits on federally run exchanges was surely a major
question, as the lack of tax credits would have led to the collapse of the
ACA. 201 On the other hand, access to courts for certain individuals
wishing to challenge the procedural soundness of the EPA's choice of
remedial actions is much less central to the operation of CERCLA
overall. This distinction may be enough for some to suggest that Chief
Justice Roberts's revision in King was warranted whereas a similar
revision in section 113(h) would not be.
This distinction, however, demonstrates the paucity of reasoning
regarding the major questions doctrine when the question is one of error
and not ambiguity. In King, Roberts still followed Chevron step one,
finding (perhaps miraculously) that "established by the State" is an
ambiguous phrase. 202 When a phrase is ambiguous and its
196. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
197. Id. at 126-29.
198. Id. at 159-60.
199. Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron provides a basic
two-step test for reviewing agency interpretations of statues: (1) is the language of the statute
clear and unambiguous? (2) If not, was the agency's interpretation reasonable? See Brown &
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 132.
200. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159-60. The Court admittedly relied on other
evidence of congressional intent as well, such as actions to regulate tobacco that Congress had
taken subsequent to the passage of the FDCA (which they presumably would not have done if they
had delegated that power to the FDA in the first place). See id. at 143 ("The inescapable conclusion
is that there is no room for tobacco products within the FDCA's regulatory scheme.").
201. See supra Section I.A.
202. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2491 (2015).
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interpretation carries enormous impact, it is understandable to suggest
that the logic of Chevron is diminished. That is, we may assume that
Congress did not leave such an important question as "who receives tax
credits" to the IRS. 2 0 3 But if someone is harmed because Congress made
a mistake-that they really did not want a particular outcome, but
wrote the wrong words down-are we really prepared to say that is fair
just because only a few people are harmed?
Put differently, if the issue in King was a "major question," then
that doctrine loses much of the logical force from Brown & Williamson.
Instead of a fairly sensible refutation of the logic of Chevron, the
doctrine becomes: "if a provision of the statute is really serious the
courts can question whether it is what Congress really meant." Read in
that light, section 113(h) has fairly serious impacts on individual
litigants and communities. If we are prepared to say that the Court was
right in imparting assumed congressional policy on the language of the
ACA because sticking to the plain meaning would have a serious effect,
then we should at least consider the acceptability of a court imparting
assumed congressional policy on the language of section 113(h).
The presence of a "major question" seems to be a poor limit on
the remedial purposes canon. It requires judges to make a judgment
about the policy impacts of a particular decision in order to determine
whether there even is a major question-a troublesome task. Then, if
the judge determines that a particular interpretation presents such a
major question, the doctrine presents a logical puzzle: if this provision
is so important, why should a judge assume that Congress did not mean
what they in fact said? Would it not be more fair to allow more drastic
remedial reading of less major questions, as those are the provisions of
statutes that might commonly receive less attention?
But perhaps the real reason the revision in King was acceptable
was that the assumed congressional policy was more than assumed-it
was clear. That may have been a popular narrative, but even a cursory
investigation of the legislative history reveals that Congress's intent
was not exactly a model of clarity.
C. Clear Intent?
Another arguable difference between the language at issue in
King and the language of section 113(h) is that the enacting Congress
203. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45 ("If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to
fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation. . . . Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency . . . is implicit rather
than explicit.").
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could not possibly have meant what they said,204 whereas the language
of section 113(h) is plausible, if harsh. Put differently, perhaps judges
should be allowed some interpretative wiggle room when the legislative
intent is clear, but should defer to the plain language when doing so is
at least reasonable. But legislative intent regarding the language at
issue in King is not exactly as clear as the popular narrative would hold.
The ACA was passed in 2010 in an odd and contentious
manner.205 After decades of reform attempts, a lengthy presidential
campaign, years of legislative back-and-forth, and plenty of procedural
intrigue, Congress passed a nine-hundred-page bill 2 06 in 2010 that set
out to regulate and restructure the entirety of America's health care
and insurance industry. Not only is it beyond the scope of this Note to
present a comprehensive legislative history of the ACA, it is not even
clear what the parameters of the "legislative history" are. 2 0 7 What is
more clear, and within the scope of this Note, is that the enacting
Congress could have intended to use the qualifying "established by the
State" language.
204. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Four Words that Imperil Health Care Law Were All a Mistake,
Writers Now Say, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/us/politics/
contested-words-in-affordable-care-act-may-have-been-left-by-mistake.html
[https://perma.cc/3SAP-ALBZ] (quoting Senator Olympia Snowe: "It was never part of our
conversations at any point" and Senator Jeff Bingaman: "As far as I know, it escaped everyone's
attention"); Sarah Kliff, Congress Had Lots of Obamacare Fights. Ending Some Subsidies Wasn't
One of Them., Vox (July 26, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://www.vox.com/2014/7/26/5937593/obamacare-
halbig-gruber-tax-credits/in/5690430 [https://perma.cclGEN7-H9T8] ("Congress never debated
whether they would limit the subsidies to states that built their own exchanges. . . . [because]
subsidies were seen as so fundamental to making the Affordable Care Act work. . .
205. Cannan, supra note 84, at 133.
206. The ACA's length is a microcosm for the entire law: it is confusing and debated. See King,
135 S. Ct. at 2500 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (citing the length as 900 pages); Brief for Amici Curiae
Senator John Cornyn et al., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114), 2015 WL 491284,
at *19 (citing the length as 2,400 pages); Warner Todd Huston, Spin Alert: The House Did Not Vote
To Repeal Obamacare 33 Times, BREITBART (July 16, 2012), http://www.breitbart.com/big-
journalism/2012/07/16/hey-media-the-house-did-not-vote-to-repeal-obamacare-33-times/
[https://perma.cc/97GX-QXZF] (citing the length as 2,700 pages); Amicus: The Storm Arrives,
SLATE, at 20:18 (June 27, 2015) (downloaded using iTunes) (citing the length as approximately
two thousand or 2,100 pages).
207. Campaign promises made by Senator Obama three years before signing? See, e.g.,
Blueprint for Change: Obama and Biden's Plan for America, OBAMA FOR AM. 24 (2008),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/550007/barack-obama-2008-blueprint-for-change.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JN9V-4UC6] (promising, inter alia, a "National Health Insurance Exchange").
Statements of Governor Romney on Massachusetts's health-care system made six years before
signing? See Mitt Romney, My Plan for Massachusetts Health Insurance Reform, Bos. GLOBE (Nov.
21, 2004), http://www.bostonglobe.comllifestylefhealth-wellness/2004/11/24/plan-for-
massachusetts-health-insurance-reform/dlllxFpnfLcQ8Ipz4nCdpJ/story.htm
[https://perma.cc/8ZNG-5ER9] (stating that his plan "will not be a government-mandated
universal coverage . . . system"). Heritage Foundation proposals written two decades before
signing? See Butler, supra note 84 (proposing an insurance mandate).
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Probably the strongest evidence of congressional intent in favor
of the Court's reading is a lack of evidence. That is, Congress did not
seem to say anything about limiting the availability of tax credits for
customers of the Federal Exchange. 208 This lack of history may have
impacted Roberts, not because he mentioned it directly, but because he
relied in part on the "elephants-in-mouseholes" canon to justify his
policy conclusions. 209 Just as Congress would not have relegated such
an important policy decision to a "sub-sub-sub section of the Tax
Code," 210 Roberts reasoned that Congress would not have made such an
important policy decision without leaving a paper trail. The elephants-
in-mouseholes argument seems to be strong evidence of national
understanding, if not congressional intent. As some state officials have
noted, they were not under the impression that foregoing the
establishment of a state exchange would deny their citizens federal tax
subsidies. 211
In the face of this supposed legislative silence, 212 those that
opposed the government's interpretation posited several pieces of
evidence to suggest that Congress did consider the possibility that tax
credits would be unavailable on federally run exchanges. 213 They
pointed to both Senator Ben Nelson's stated fear of a national exchange
and his importance to the passage of the Act. 2 14 More convincingly, they
pointed to an earlier version of the ACA that explicitly denied tax
credits to customers of the Federal Exchange for four years in an
attempt to penalize states that did not set up exchanges. 215 But these
208. See Brief Amici Curiae of Members of Congress and State Legislatures, Halbig v.
Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No.14-5018), 2014 WL 5585306, at *10 (If ... members of
Congress had intended to use the tax credits to encourage States to set up their own Exchanges,
surely someone at some point would have suggested as much."); supra note 204 and accompanying
text.
209. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495; see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)
("Congress, we have held, does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague
terms or ancillary provisions-it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.").
210. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495; Whitman, 531 U.S. at 2001.
211. See Brief Amici Curiae of Members of Congress and State Legislatures, supra note 208,
at *5.
212. See King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 371 (4th Cir. 2014) ("The Act's legislative history is
also not particularly illuminating on the issue of tax credits.").
213. For some more pieces of evidence not discussed in this Note, see Halbig v. Sebelius, 27
F. Supp. 3d 1, 24 (D.D.C. 2014); Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 23, King v. Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d 415 (2014) (Civil Action No. 3:13-CV-630) 2013
WL 6079950; Brief for Amici Curiae Senator John Cornyn et al., supra note 206, at *6.
214. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 409 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
215. See id. at 408. Scalia, interestingly, does not even mention this earlier bill, perhaps
because the fact that this version was not adopted speaks as much to the contrary interpretation.
Still, even if prior drafts rank low on the legislative history totem pole, this is really the only
concrete evidence that any members of Congress ever considered using tax credit availability as a
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few examples demonstrate the fickle nature of legislative history.
Senator Nelson was afraid of a national exchange, but as Judge Griffith
(who ruled for the Petitioner's interpretation in the lower court) pointed
out, that fact did not necessarily mean he was afraid of tax credits being
issued to Federal Exchange customers. 216 A prior version of the bill does
seem to suggest that Congress at least considered using tax credits
coercively, but the fact that it was a prior version could suggest just as
strongly that Congress abandoned that idea. 217
An excellent example of the confusing history surrounding what
Congress meant is Jonathan Gruber and his conflicting statements. On
January 10, 2012, Gruber, who had worked closely with the Obama
Administration in crafting the ACA, 218 spoke at the Jewish Community
Center of San Francisco and claimed that if a state did not set up an
exchange, they would lose "hundreds of millions of dollars in tax
credits." 219 Ten days later, at the Noblis Technology Conference, Gruber
stated that "if you're a state and you don't set up an exchange that
means your citizens don't get their tax credits." 220 Then, roughly one
year later, Gruber characterized the idea that tax credits would be
unavailable to citizens who purchased insurance on a federal exchange
as "nutty."221 On July 22, 2014, the day that the Fourth Circuit handed
down its decision siding with the government's interpretation, Gruber
said of the "established by the State" language: "literally every single
coercive tool-a cornerstone of Petitioner's argument. See Brief for Petitioners, King v. Burwell,
135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No.14-114), 2014 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4530, at *11. Yet this prior draft
is left out of Petitioner's briefs, and, of all the briefs in the actions below, seems to only be raised
in passing by amici Senators. See Brief for Amici Curiae Senator John Cornyn et al., supra note
206, at *6.
216. See Halbig, 758 F.3d at 409 n.11.
217. See supra note 215.
218. As is the case with everything Gruber has said about the law, even his position and
involvement is disputed. Compare Peter Suderman, Yes, Jonathan Gruber Is An Obamacare
'Architect," REASON (Nov. 18, 2014), http://reason.com/archives/2014/11/18/yes-jonathan-gruber-
is-an-obamacare-arch#.Orrdnc:EoeB [https://perma.ccl5DJS-8DCE] (emphasizing the role that
Gruber played and referring to Gruber as a "key architect"), with Examining Obamacare
Transparency Failures: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 113th Cong.
(2014) [hereinafter Hearings] (written testimony of Professor Jonathan Gruber), http://oversight
.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Gruber-Statement-12-9-ObamaCarel.pdf [https://perma
.cc/4U62-Z3U7] (stating "I was not the 'architect' of President Obama's health care plan").
219. John Sexton, Jonathan Gruber Once Again Says Subsidies Are Tied to State-Based
Exchanges, YOUTUBE, at 1:19 (July 25, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-LbMmWhfZyEI
[https://perma.cclRSM3-QCLH ] (transcribed by the author).
220. NoblisNetwork, Jonathan Gruber at Noblis--January 18, 2012, YOUTUBE, at 32:00 (Jan.
20, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-GtnEmPXEprO [https://perma.cc/99RX-ERVG]
(transcribed by the author).
221. Erika Eichelberger, Conservatives Insist Obamacare Is on Its Death Bed, MOTHER JONES
(Jan. 24, 2013, 6:06 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/01/obamacare-exchanges-
conservative-cato-freedomworks [https://perma.cc/8HW2-H3JFI.
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person involved in the crafting of this law has said that it's a typo." 2 2 2
After his earlier statement to the contrary given at the Noblis
conference was posted online, 223 Gruber stated that his earlier
statement had been "a mistake." 224 Finally, in December of 2014, at a
House Oversight and Government Reform hearing, he alleged that his
earlier remarks had been taken out of context.225 If legislative history
is akin to "looking over a crowd and picking out your friends," 226 then
Gruber stands for the proposition that you should be careful that your
friends are not schizophrenic.
Hopefully this very brief overview has proved the necessary
point: it is not exactly clear what Congress intended in 2010. It seems
odd that there would be so little evidence in the legislative history of
Congress' intention to withhold tax credits on the Federal Exchange,
but then again, they may have failed to realize that so many states
would not set up exchanges. 227 If the language means what it plainly
says, then the drafting Congress would have reasonably assumed that
most states would set up exchanges so as to capture the tax benefits for
their citizens. It seems odd that Jonathan Gruber, who was clearly
knowledgeable about the workings of the ACA, would claim that tax
credits were only available through state exchanges. But, then again,
maybe he, and not Congress, was the one making a mistake. 228
This foggy history should at least call into question the use of
seemingly obvious intent as a justification for remedial revision. To be
222. "Hardball with Chris Matthews" for Tuesday, July 22nd, 2014, NBC NEWS (July 23,
2014, 9:20 AM), http://www.nbenews.com/id/55705739/ns/msnbc-hardball with-chris-matthews/#
.VaGJBOlVikr [https://perma.cc/7XAL-33LW].
223. Ryan Radia, Obamacare Architect Admitted in 2012 States Without Exchanges Lose
Subsidies, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. BLOG (July 24, 2014), https://cei.org/blog/obamacare-
architect-admitted-2012-states-without-exchanges-lose-subsidies [https://perma.cc/UN5V-D8UF].
224. Jonathan Cohn, Jonathan Gruber: "It Was Just a Mistake," NEW REPUBLIC (July 25,
2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118851/jonathan-gruber-halbig-says-quote-exchanges-
was-mistake [https://perma.cc/248S-XXP3].
225. Hearings, supra note 218.
226. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
227. See Robert Pear, U.S. Officials Brace for Huge Task of Operating Health Exchanges, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/05/us/us-officials-brace-for-huge-task-of-
running-health-exchanges.html?_r-1 [https://perma.cc/KD62-3GK6] ("Mr. Obama and lawmakers
assumed that every state would set up its own exchange.").
228. The list could go on. Another piece of history relied upon in the courts below was a CBO
report from 2009 which calculated anticipated subsidies across all states. CONGR. BUDGET OFFICE,
AN ANALYSIS OF HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2009). Judge Friedman, who ruled for the government, relied on this
report as evidence of Congress's assumption "that tax credits would be available nationwide."
Halbig v. Sebelius, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1, 24 (D.D.C. 2014). But in 2009, Congress probably assumed
that all states would set up exchanges, see supra note 227, and the CBO report may reflect that
assumption.
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clear, Congress did seem to understand that section 113(h) would serve
to bar many litigants from challenging actions. 229 But they seemed to
understand that doing so was necessary to prevent delay when cleaning
up hazardous substances. 230 It is far from clear that they would have
consented to the language of section 113(h) if they had known it would
in certain instances allow for greater delay, or deprive citizens, or even
industry, of the ability to challenge the EPA's process for determining
a course of action that might take decades to complete and cost millions
of dollars. Supposedly clear intent, then, is a slippery limit for this type
of drastic remedial reading. As discussed above, 231 the "purpose" of a
law can be evident from a certain distance, but grows more confused as
the reader drills down into specific provisions.
Ultimately, none of these supposed differences between the ACA
and CERCLA provide a solid reason for a remedial rewording of one and
not the other. If judges are satisfied with the outcome of King, then they
should be open to similar attempts to work around the plain language
of a law that seems to conflict with its goal. They should be willing to
employ the remedial purposes canon to read "remedial" out of SARA
section 113(h) and allow parties to challenge EPA clean up actions after
removal actions have been completed.
CONCLUSION
Legislatures make mistakes. Sometimes, despite our best
efforts, changing circumstances can foil future plans. What is the role
of a judge when confronted with such a situation? Based on the ruling
in King, one might reasonably suggest that the role of a judge is to serve
as the faithful interpreter of the law, bringing to life the true intentions
of Congress and reading the law so as best to remedy the evil it was
intended to confront. If that is true, then why should a court continue
to withhold jurisdiction over plaintiffs, such as citizen advocacy groups,
who wish to compel cleanups or challenge methods, when a remedial
action is planned at a CERCLA site? To be clear, allowing such a
challenge to proceed would be nothing less than a judicial revision of
section 113(h). But, what was the outcome in King if not a judicial
revision? 232
229. See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
230. See id.
231. See supra Section I.B.
232. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Let us not
forget, however, why context matters: It is a tool for understanding the terms of the law, not an
excuse for rewriting them.").
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Section 113(h) in some ways is ripe for this type of remedial
reading. The purposes of the law overall and the intention behind
section 113(h) are generally understood. CERCLA is a paragon of
remedial statutes and has already been subject to judicial tinkering, if
not outright revision. But, the solution this Note presents and its
justifications are a Rorschach test. One may read it and think that King
was well decided and section 113(h) deserves the same treatment.
Others may see the problems with this type of reading.
Employing this extent of remedial reading only in cases where the
legislature is unlikely to act presents an odd inquiry for judges-and
such cases are quickly becoming the rule and not the exception.
Withholding this type of remedial reading only for major questions
presents two problems: Are we more willing to let judges resolve
questions when they are "major"? And are we willing to let a litigant
face injustice due to a congressional mistake just because the question
is not "major"? Perhaps judges should only employ this remedial
reading when the legislative history is obvious, but that may assume
too much-namely, that legislative history can ever be obvious.
Ultimately, the reason why such an interpretation of the
statutory text is acceptable in King and unacceptable for judges
grappling with section 113(h) is far from clear. What is clear is the need
for such a reason. If none can be found, then what is needed is an
admission: that a remedial reading of section 113(h), and a host of other
statutory provisions with unintended consequences, is acceptable.
Benjamin Raker*
* I would like to thank Michael Vandenbergh for teaching me many things, including
environmental law, and for pointing out the linguistic problems with "owners and operators";
Edward Rubin for encouraging me to think weirdly and aggressively about the law; Laura Dolbow
for being a good friend and strong-arming me into submitting this Note for publication; and to my
wonderful family for being supportive and arguing with me.
11812017]

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
2016-2017 EDITORIAL BOARD
Editor in Chief
SUSANNAM. RYCHLAK
Executive Editor
STANLEY ONYEADOR
;enior Articles Editor
LAURA DOLBOW
Articles Editors
MICHAEL BRINKLEY
KYLE D, LYONs-BURKE
ANDREW J. MARINO
KATHERINE E. MARTIN
DLAYTON MASTERMAN
JOHN A. SMITTEN
HANNAH E. WEBBER
PATRICKJ. WEEKS
KASEYYOUNGENTOB
ZOE M. BEINER
JESSICA N. BERKOWITZ
RYAN W. BROWN
CASSANDRA M. BURNS
M. ALEX CARVER
ELIZABETH CHITWOOD
CATHERINE C. CIRIELLO
JACOB T. CLABO
Senior Notes Editor
CLINTONM. BARKER
Notes Development Editor
BENJAMIN D. RAKER
Notes Editors
BRIANP. BAXTER
ELISE K. HEUBERGER
ABIGAIL E. MOSKOWITZ
ALLEN M. THIGPEN
Staff
PAIGE N. COSTAKOS
MONICAE. DION
NICOLE A. DRESSLER
JORDAN B. FERNANDES
JESSICA L. HAUSHALTER
KAITLYN 0. HAWKINS
R. TURNER HENDERSON
NELL B. HENSON
Senior ManagingEditor
LAURA C. WILLIAMS
Conventions Editor
CARLY A. MYERS
Managing Editors
M. LORA CHOWDHURY
LOREND. GOODMAN
ELLISON G. JOHNSTONE
ERIC C. LYONS
GREGORY M. SERAYDARIAN
CAROLYN E. WEBB
LOGANR. HOBSON
SAMUEL J. JOLLY
KOURTNEYJ. KINSEL
MIRON KLIMKOWSKI
MORGAN S. MASON
SHANNON C. MCDERMOTI
ALEXANDRAM. ORTIZ
W. ALLEN PERRY JR.
Senior En Banc Editor
HANNAH J. FRANK
En Banc Editors
TIFFANY M. BURBA
JOHN F. KERKHOFF
DEVON L. STRAUSS
HAILEY S. VERANO
Symposium Editor
SORAYA GHEBLEH
Publication Editor
AARON K. ROTHBAUM
DANIELLE J. REID
VICTORIA L. ROMVARY
JULIE L. ROONEY
BENJAMIN H. STEINER
BRADEN M. STEVENSON
NICOLE A. WEEKS
MARGARET G. WIuNK-
JESSICAF. WILSON
BLAKE C. WOODWARD
ADELE M. EL-KHOURI'13
ASHLEY E. JOHNSON'04
Alumni Advisory Committee
RYANT. HoLT'10, Chair
J. MARIA GLOVER'07
WILLIAM T. MARKS '14
ANDREW R. GOULD'10
ROBERT S. REDER'78
culty Advisor
iAN B. SEYMORE
Program Coordinator
FAYE JOHNSON
VANDERBILT LAW SCHOOL
OFFICERS OF THE UNIVERSITY
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Chancellor of the University; Professor of Law
Susan Wente, Provost and Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs
Audrey Anderson, Vice Chancellor, General Counsel and Secretary of the
University
Jeffrey Balser, Vice Chancellor for Health Affairs and Dean of the School of
Medicine
Beth Fortune, Vice Chancellor for Public Affairs
Anders Hall, Vice Chancellor for Investments and Chief Investment Officer
George Hill, Vice Chancellor for Equity, Diversity and Inclusion and Chief
Diversity Officer
Eric Kopstain, Vice Chancellor for Administration
John M. Lutz, Vice Chancellor for Information Technology
Susie Stalcup, Vice Chancellor for Development and Alumni Relations
Brett Sweet, Vice Chancellor for Finance and Chief Financial Officer
David Williams II, Vice Chancellor for Athletics and University Affairs and
Athletics Director; Professor of Law
ILAw SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS
Chris Guthrie, Dean of the Law School; John Wade-Kent Syverud Professor of
Law
Lisa Bressman, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs; David Daniels Allen
Distinguished Chair in Law; Professor of Law
Susan Kay, Associate Dean for Clinical Affairs; Clinical Professor of Law
Spring Miller, Assistant Dean for Public Interest; Lecturer in Law
Kelly Murray, Director, Professional Education; Instructor in Law
Larry Reeves, Associate Professor of Law; Associate Dean & Director, Law
Library
FACULTY
Philip Ackerman-Lieberman, Assistant Professor of Jewish Studies; Assistant
Professor of Religious Studies; Assistant Professor of History; Assistant Professor
of Law
Rebecca Allensworth, Associate Professor of Law
Robert Barsky, Professor of European Studies; Professor of English; Professor of Law;
Professor of Jewish Studies; Professor of French and Comparative Literature;
Chair of the Department of French and Italian; Director of the W.T.Bandy Center
for Baudelaire and Modern French Studies
Margaret M. Blair, Milton R. Underwood Chair in Free Enterprise; Professor of Law
Frank Bloch, Professor of Law Emeritus
James F. Blumstein, University Professor of Constitutional Law and Health Law &
Policy; Professor of Management; Owen Graduate School of Management;
Director, Vanderbilt Health Policy Center
C. Dent Bostick, Professor of Law Emeritus; Dean Emeritus
Michael Bressman, Professor of the Practice of Law
Jon Bruce, Professor of Law Emeritus
Kitt Carpenter, Professor of Economics; Professor of Health Policy; Professor of
Medicine, Health and Society; Professor of Law
James Cheek, Professor of the Practice of Law; Partner, Bass Berry & Sims
Edward K. Cheng, Professor of Law; Tarkington Chair of Teaching Excellence
William Christie, Frances Hampton Currey Professor of Finance; Professor of Finance;
Professor of Law
Ellen Wright Clayton, Craig-Weaver Chair in Pediatrics; Professor of Pediatrics;
Professor of Health Policy; Professor of Law
Mark Cohen, Justin Potter Professor of American Competitive Enterprise; Professor of
Management; Professor of Law
Robert Covington, Professor of Law Emeritus
Kareem Crayton, Visiting Professor of Law; Founder and Managing Partner,
Crimcard Consulting Services
Andrew Daughety, Gertrude Conaway Vanderbilt Professor of Economics; Professor of
Economics; Professor of Law
Colin Dayan, Robert Penn Warren Professor in the Humanities; Professor of American
Studies; Professor of Law
Paul H. Edelman, Professor of Mathematics; Professor of Law
Joseph Fishman, Assistant Professor of Law
James Ely, Jr., Milton R. Underwood Professor of Law Emeritus; Professor of History
Emeritus
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Professor of Law
Tracey E. George, Charles B. Cox III and Lucy D. Cox Family Chair in Law & Liberty;
Professor of Law; Director, Cecil D. Branstetter Litigation and Dispute Resolution
Program
Daniel J. Gervais, Professor of Law; Professor in French; Director, Vanderbilt
Intellectual Property Program; Director, LL.M. Program
Leor Halevi, Associate Professor of History; Associate Professor of Law
Joni Hersch, Professor of Management; Professor of Law and Economics; Co-Director,
Ph.D. Program in Law and Economics
Alex J. Hurder, Clinical Professor of Law
Sarah Igo, Associate Professor of American Studies; Associate Professor of Sociology;
Associate Professor of History; Associate Professor of Law
Owen D. Jones, New York Alumni Chancellor's Chair in Law; Professor of Law;
Professor of Biological Sciences
Nancy J. King, Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law
Russell Korobkin, Visiting Professor of Law; Richard G. Maxwell Professor of Law,
UCLA Law School
David Lewis, William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of Political Science; Professor of Political
Science; Professor of Law; Chair of the Department of Political Science
Harold Maier 1937-2014, David Daniels Professor of Law Emeritus
Terry A. Maroney, Professor of Medicine, Health, and Society; Professor of Law; Co-
Director, Social Justice Program
John Marshall, Associate Professor of Law Emeritus
William Marshall, Visiting Professor of Law
Larry May, W. Alton Chair of Philosophy; Professor of Law
Sara Mayeux, Assistant Professor; Assistant Professor of Law
Holly McCammon, Professor of Human and Organization Development; Professor of
Law; Professor of Sociology
Thomas McCoy, Professor of Law Emeritus
Timothy Meyer, Professor of Law
Robert Mikos, Professor of Law
Beverly I. Moran, Professor of Law; Professor of Sociology
Alistair E. Newbern, Associate Clinical Professor of Law
Michael A. Newton, Professor of the Practice of Law; Director, Vanderbilt-in-Venice
Program
Robert S. Reder, Professor of the Practice of Law; Partner, Milbank Tweed Hadley &
McCloy (Retired)
Yolanda Redero, Assistant Clinical Professor of Law
Jennifer Reinganum, E. Bronson Ingram Professor of Economics; Professor of Law
Philip Morgan Ricks, Associate Professor of Law
Amanda M. Rose, Professor of Law
Barbara Rose, Instructor in Law
James Rossi, Professor of Law; Director, Program in Law and Government Program
Edward L. Rubin, University Professor of Law and Political Science; Professor of
Political Science
John B. Ruhl, David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair in Law; Professor of Law;
Director, Program in Law and Innovation; Co-Director, Energy, Environment,
and Land Use Program
Herwig Schlunk, Professor of Law
Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Centennial Professor of Law
Christopher Serkin, Associate Dean for Research; Professor of Law
Sean B. Seymore, 2015-16 FedEx Research Professor; Professor of Law; Professor of
Chemistry; Chancellor Faculty Fellow
Daniel J. Sharfstein, Professor of Law; Professor of History; Chancellor Faculty
Fellow; Co-Director, George Barrett Social Justice Program
Matthew Shaw, Assistant Professor of Law
Suzanna Sherry, Herman 0. Loewenstein Chair in Law
Jennifer Shinall, Assistant Professor of Law
Ganesh N. Sitaraman, Assistant Professor of Law
Paige Marta Skiba, Professor of Law
Christopher Slobogin, Milton R. Underwood Chair in Law; Professor of Law; Director,
Criminal Justice Program; Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences;
Kevin Stack, Professor of Law; Director of Graduate Studies, Ph.D. Program
in Law and Economics
Carol Swain, Professor of Political Science; Professor of Law
Jennifer Swezey, Assistant Professor of Law; Director, Legal Writing Program
Randall Thomas, John S. Beasley II Chair in Law and Business; Director, Law and
Business Program; Professor of Management, Owen Graduate School of
Management
Christoph Van der Elst, Visiting Professor of Law
R. Lawrence Van Horn, Associate Professor of Management (Economics); Associate
Professor of Law; Executive Director of Health Affairs
Michael P. Vandenbergh, David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair in Law; Professor
of Law; Director, Climate Change Research Network; Co-Director, Energy,
Environment, and Land Use Program
W. Kip Viscusi, University Distinguished Professor of Law, Economics, and
Management; Professor of Management; Professor of Economics; Co-Director,
Ph.D. Program in Law and Economics
Alan Wiseman, Professor of Political Science; Professor of Law
Ingrid Wuerth, Helen Strong Curry Chair in International Law; Professor of Law;
Director, International Legal Studies Program
Yesha Yadav, Associate Professor of Law
Claire Abely, Instructor in Law
Lawrence Ahern III, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Brown & Ahern
Arshad Ahmed, Adjunct Professor of Law; Co-Founder, Elixir Capital Management
Richard Aldrich Jr., Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher
& Flom (Retired)
Andrea Alexander, Research Services Librarian; Lecturer in Law
Samar Ali, Adjunct Professor of Law; Attorney, Bass Berry & Sims
Roger Alsup, Instructor in Law
Paul Ambrosius, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Trauger & Tuke
Rachel Andersen-Watts, Instructor in Law
Gordon Bonnyman, Adjunct Professor of Law; Staff Attorney, Tennessee Justice Center
Kathryn (Kat) Booth, Instructor in Law
Linda Breggin, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Attorney, Environmental Law
Institute
Larry Bridgesmith, Adjunct Professor of Law; Coordinator Program on Law and
Innovation; Inaugural Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management,
Lipscomb University
Mark Brody, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Seward & Kissel
Henry Burnett, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, King & Spalding
Judge Sheila Jones Calloway, Adjunct Professor of Law; Juvenile Court Magistrate,
Metropolitan Nashville
Robert Cary, Adjunct Professor of Law; Co-chair, Legal Malpractice and Ethics Group,
Williams & Connolly
Nicole Chamberlain, Instructor in Law
Jenny Cheng, Lecturer in Law
Jessica Beess und Chrostin, Adjunct Professor of Law; Associate, King & Spalding
William Cohen, Adjunct Professor of Law
Christoper Coleman, Adjunct Professor of Law
Mike Collins, Adjunct Professor of Law
Roger Conner, Adjunct Professor of Law; Special Consultant on Public Service Career
Development
Robert Cooper, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sims
Matthew Curley, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sims
S. Carran Daughtrey, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant U.S. Attorney, Middle
Tennessee District
Catherine Deane, Foreign & International Law Librarian; Lecturer in Law
Diane Di lanni, Adjunct Professor of Law
Patricia Eastwood, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Corporate Counsel, Caterpillar
Financial Services Corporation
Jason Epstein, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Nelson Mullins
Anne-Marie Farmer, Adjunct Professor of Law
William Farmer, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Jones Hawkins & Farmer
Carolyn Floyd, Research Services Librarian; Lecturer in Law
Glenn Funk, Adjunct Professor of Law; District Attorney General, 20th Judicial District
of Tennessee
Jason Gichner, Adjunct Professor of Law; Attorney, Morgan & Morgan
Vice Chancellor Sam Glassock, Adjunct Professor of Law; Vice Chancellor, Delaware
Court of Chancery
Trey Harwell, Adjunct Professor of Law
Kristen Hildebrand, Instructor in Law
Darwin Hindman III, Adjunct Professor of Law; Shareholder, Baker Donelson
The Honorable Randy Holland, Adjunct Professor of Law; Justice, Delaware Supreme
Court
David L. Hudson, Adjunct Professor of Law
Abrar Hussain, Adjunct Professor of Law; Co-founder and Managing Director, Elixir
Capital Management
Lynne Ingram, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant U.S. Attorney, Middle District of
Tennessee
Marc Jenkins, Adjunct Professor of Law; Associate General Counsel & Executive Vice
President-Knowledge Strategy, Cicayda
Martesha Johnson, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant Public Defender, Metropolitan
Nashville Public Defender's Office, 20th Judicial District
Michele Johnson, Adjunct Professor of Law; Executive Director, Tennessee Justice
Center
Lydia Jones, Adjunct Professor of Law
The Honorable Kent Jordan, Adjunct Professor of Law; Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit
Andrew Kaufman, Adjunct Professor of Law
Suzanne Kessler, Adjunct Professor of Law; Of Counsel, Bone McAllester Norton
Kelly Leventis, Instructor in Law
Jerry Martin, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison
Will Martin, Adjunct Professor of Law, General Counsel, FirstBank; Retired Board
Chair, Stewardship Council
Cheryl Mason, Adjunct Professor of Law; Vice President, Litigation HCA
Richard McGee, Adjunct Professor of Law
James McNamara, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant Public Defender, Metro
Nashville Public Defender's Office
Bryan Metcalf, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sims
Julie Moss, Instructor in Law; Of Counsel, The Blair Law Firm
Anne-Marie Moyes, Adjunct Professor of Law; Federal Public Defender, Middle
District of Tennessee
Kelly Murray, Instructor in Law
Francisco Milssnich, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Partner, Barbosa Miissnich &
Aragao Advogados
Sara Beth Myers, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant Attorney General, State of
Tennessee
William Norton III, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Bradley Arant Boult
Cummings
R. Gregory Parker, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sims
C. Mark Pickrell, Adjunct Professor of Law; Owner Pickrell Law Group
Mary Prince, Associate Director for Library Services; Lecturer in Law
Eli Richardson, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sims
Steven Riley, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Riley Warnock & Jacobson
Brian Roark, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Bass Berry & Sims
Barbara Rose, Instructor in Law
John Ryder, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Harris Shelton Hanover Walsh
Deborah Schander, Research Services Librarian; Lecturer in Law
Mark Schein, Adjunct Professor of Law; Chief Compliance Officer, York Capital
Management
Paul Schnell, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom
Arjun Sethi, Adjunct Professor of Law
Dumaka Shabazz, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant Federal Public Defender'
Federal Public Defender's Office
Justin Shuler, Adjunct Professor of Law; Associate, Paul Weiss
Jason Sowards, Associate Director for Public Services; Lecturer in Law
Willy Stern, Adjunct Professor of Law
Casey Summar, Adjunct Professor of Law; Executive Director, Arts & Business
Counsel of Greater Nashville
Judge Amul Thapar, Adjunct Professor of Law; Judge, U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky
Wendy Tucker, Adjunct Professor of Law; Attorney, McGee, Lyons and Ballinger;
Member, Tennessee Board of Education
Timothy Warnock, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Riley Warnock & Jacobson
Robert Watson, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Vice President & Chief Legal Officer,
Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority
Margaret Williams, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Research Associate, Federal
Judicial Center
Justin Wilson, Adjunct Professor of Law; Comptroller, State of Tennessee
Thomas Wiseman III, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Wiseman Ashworth Law
Group
Mariah Wooten, Adjunct Professor of Law; First Assistant Public Defender,
Middle District of Tennessee
Tyler Yarbro, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Dodson Parker Behm & Capparella

